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DIGITAL MARKET PERFECTION 
Rory Van Loo* 
Google’s, Apple’s, and other companies’ automated assistants are increasing-
ly serving as personal shoppers. These digital intermediaries will save us time 
by purchasing grocery items, transferring bank accounts, and subscribing to 
cable. The literature has only begun to hint at the paradigm shift needed to 
navigate the legal risks and rewards of this coming era of automated com-
merce. This Article begins to fill that gap by surveying legal battles related to 
contract exit, data access, and deception that will determine the extent to 
which automated assistants are able to help consumers to search and switch, 
potentially bringing tremendous societal benefits. Whereas observers have 
largely focused on protecting consumers and sellers from digital intermediar-
ies’ market power, sellers like Amazon, Comcast, and Wells Fargo can also 
harm consumers by obstructing automated assistants. Advancing consumer 
welfare in the automated era requires not just consumer protection, but digi-
tal intermediary protection. 
The Article also shows the unpredictable side of eliminating switching costs. 
If digital assistants become pervasive, they could gain the ability to rapidly 
direct millions of consumers to new purchases whenever a lower price or new 
innovation becomes available. Significantly accelerated consumer switch-
ing—what I call hyperswitching—does not inevitably harm society. But in the 
extreme it could make some large markets more volatile, raising unemploy-
ment costs or financial stability concerns as more firms fail. This new kind of 
disruption could pose challenges for commercial and banking regulators akin 
to those familiar to securities regulators, who deploy idiosyncratic tools such 
as a pause button for the stock market. Even if sellers prevent extreme 
hyperswitching, managers may strategically prepare for hyperswitching with 
economically costly behavior such as hoarding liquid assets or forming con-
glomerates to provide insurance against a sudden exodus of customers. The 
transaction-cost-focused literature has missed macro-level drawbacks. 
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Law School Information Society Project. For valuable input, I am grateful to Vince Buccola, 
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816 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:815 
The regulatory architecture reflects these scholarly gaps. One set of agencies 
regulates automated assistants for consumer protection and antitrust viola-
tions but does not go beyond those microeconomic inquiries. Nor do they pri-
oritize strengthening digital intermediaries. Regulators with more 
macroeconomic missions lack jurisdiction over automated assistants. The in-
tellectual framework and regulatory architecture should expand to encom-
pass both the upsides and downsides of digital consumer sovereignty. 
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The world’s largest companies, including Apple, Google, and Microsoft, 
are racing to develop artificially intelligent butlers (AIs). They aim to allow 
consumers to outsource the tasks of opening a new bank account, locating 
cheaper laundry detergent, and finding the highest quality groceries.1 By way 
of illustration, a consumer might at any moment receive a phone alert from 
her AI. The subsequent conversation could unfold as follows: 
SIRI. As part of my regular monitoring of your spending, I have located an 
opportunity to save money on your phone bill and on your grocery bill 
each month. Would you like to hear more? 
CONSUMER. Tell me about the phone bill. 
SIRI. Based on your monthly data usage and the performance of the net-
works where you spend most of your time, you can receive comparable ser-
vice through Sprint at $140 less per year. Let me know if you want to hear 
more. Or, if you would like me to switch your account, place your thumb-
print on the phone. 
The imminent technological possibility that machines could take over 
most of the consumer’s purchase process calls for a reexamination of the 
framework for market intervention. This Article expands on the literature 
beginning that undertaking in three main ways. The first is to show the 
broader legal reforms and intellectual shifts that would help AIs to reduce 
transaction costs.2 Today, even when competing products are available at the 
 
 1. Jack Nicas & Laura Stevens, Wal-Mart and Google Team Up to Challenge Amazon, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2017, 2:09 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wal-mart-and-google-
partner-to-challenge-amazon-1503460861 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 2. Scholars have begun to consider implications for a narrower set of implicated laws 
and markets. See Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial 
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713 (2018) (focusing on insurance, mortgage, and invest-
ment robo advisers); Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 309 (2017) (focusing largely on the implications of algorithmic consumers for anti-
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click of a button, shoppers regularly fail to locate the best deal.3 People simp-
ly may not want to spend the time clicking on various sites and calculating 
the differences. Sellers also make shopping more difficult by burying the 
lowest price option in the second page of search results, where few look, or 
by hiding costs through fees or add-on products, such as expensive printer 
ink.4 The recent scholarship on digital intermediaries has largely focused on 
preventing technology firms from adding harm—which they might do by 
directly manipulating users or indirectly exercising market power over 
sellers.5 Consumer harms from sellers’ behavior toward AIs have received 
less attention.6 But consumers are also harmed when, for instance, sellers de-
ceive the AI into giving bad advice to the consumer or prevent AIs from hav-
ing full access to market data. Counterintuitively, consumer welfare may 
depend on even powerful technology companies benefitting from the types 
of laws traditionally deployed to protect consumers. 
Part of the challenge in seeing the need for such policies may be a lim-
ited sense of the potential magnitude of efficiency gains.7 Before Ronald 
Coase’s contributions to law and economics, models assumed an absence of 
 
trust law); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 232 (2018) (focusing on automated advisers for consumer finance). 
 3. For a review of the theory and empirics of this phenomenon, see, for example, Mi-
chael D. Grubb, Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 47 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 303, 311–12 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., id. 
 5. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1009 (2013) (discussing privacy and antitrust harms to consumers); Rory Van Loo, Rise of the 
Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2017) [hereinafter Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator] 
(analyzing harms by digital intermediaries to both consumers and end sellers but also discuss-
ing legal reforms that would be needed for digital intermediaries to help consumers); see also 
Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, Essay, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017) (detailing power asymmetries). As electronic commerce was 
emerging, some observers were enthusiastic about frictionless commerce and digital agents 
such as “infomediaries.” While that literature is insightful and relevant, it largely dealt with a 
prior generation of digital intermediaries that would provide the information to consumers, 
rather than the focus of this Article—automated assistants that can take over the entire pur-
chase process. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
1151, 1156, 1199 (summarizing early proposals for infomediaries and seeing promise in emerg-
ing technologies that would ensure the marketing that reached people matched their prefer-
ences). 
 6. The main exception is awareness of the need for legal reforms to provide digital in-
termediaries with data access. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for 
Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1345–47 (2015) (proposing legal rules requir-
ing big retailers to disclose product data). For an analysis of data access barriers in relation to 
antitrust law, see Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 342–43. 
 7. To be clear, scholars have embraced the potential for digital intermediaries to make 
markets more efficient. See, e.g., Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and 
Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 293, 295 (2016). 
March 2019] Digital Market Perfection 819 
transaction costs.8 The modern high-transaction-cost paradigm results from 
generations of Nobel Prize–winning work by Coase and others showing that 
real-world markets instead face high transaction costs that impede switch-
ing, including from information asymmetries and behavioral biases.9 Those 
intellectual contributions have made models more accurate but have also 
normalized high transaction costs because it has proven difficult to improve 
markets meaningfully as long as consumers still play an active role.10 
Through that lens, an observer would see the opportunity for significant 
market improvements but would not be surprised by markets with minimal 
searching and switching. With an alternative baseline of automated markets, 
minimal searching and switching should prompt inquiry into potential AI 
barriers. In other words, the intellectual framework for automated com-
merce should recognize that through AI protection laws, real markets can 
move closer to those in discarded pre-Coasian models. 
The Article’s second contribution is to expand upon the downsides as-
sociated with AIs, and with hyperswitching in particular. Once they take 
hold, AIs could potentially constitute a new form of disruption by collapsing 
firms more quickly, reaching a larger portion of the economy, and extending 
uncertainty longer. Assume, for instance, that the above digital advice to 
switch cell phone carriers was given by Apple’s Siri, which operates about 
54% of mobile operating systems.11 If a quarter of Siri’s customers were to 
switch cell phone carriers upon locating savings, this would amount to a 
mass exodus of customers from several large Fortune 500 companies, such as 
Verizon and AT&T. But the cell phone carrier benefitting from that advice 
could lose in the next round of advice. Mass departures are more likely if the 
AI market follows that of other highly concentrated digital markets such as 
 
 8. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1, 1–3; 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 366 n.41, 398 (2001) (“The influence of The Problem of Social Cost is 
hard to overstate. It is almost certainly the most-cited article in law and possibly in econom-
ics . . . .”). 
 9. Nobel Prizes in this area include those to Ronald Coase (1991) and Douglas North 
(1993) for transaction cost developments; to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz (2001) for information asymmetries; and to Daniel Kahneman (2002) and Richard 
Thaler (2017) for behavioral economics. See All Prizes in Economic Sciences, NOBEL PRIZE, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/uncategorized/all-prizes-in-economic-sciences/ 
[https://perma.cc/9SZ4-BQNT]. Each of these three strands of research has had profound, and 
long-lasting, influence on legal scholarship and policy. See infra Sections I.B, II.A. 
 10. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (concluding that disclosures directed at consumers have limited ef-
fects); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1595–97 (2014) (arguing that choice-preserving interventions are un-
likely to have a major impact because they preserve choice). 
 11. Greg Ip, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, Google and Amazon, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 16, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-case-against-facebook-
google-amazon-and-apple-1516121561 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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smartphones, in which Apple and Google together provide 99% of mobile 
operating systems.12 
To be clear, extreme hyperswitching may never occur in many indus-
tries. Besides the possibility that entrenched firms will strive to prevent it, 
markets also have some inherent limits, such as capacity constraints on 
sellers’ ability to service large numbers of new customers on short notice.13 
But given the stakes, as AIs gain influence, other companies like Citibank, 
AT&T, and Clorox may need to prepare strategically for the possibility of 
hyperswitching—and some have already begun to do so.14 Predictable moves 
include forming conglomerates to diversify revenues; hoarding cash or other 
liquid assets to provide insurance in case revenues drop; and colluding with 
other firms on price so that AIs have little basis to redirect consumers. Those 
changes are important to consider because they implicate policy decisions, 
and they could significantly lessen the efficiency gains that motivate regula-
tors and scholars to design laws empowering digital intermediaries.15 Thus, 
even if hyperswitching never arrives, large companies’ fears of it could re-
shape industrial organization, capital markets, and the economy. 
Another set of downsides relates to the volatility that could result if ex-
treme hyperswitching materializes. Numerous scholars have concluded that 
financial technology innovation poses a threat to economic stability.16 That 
literature has extensively analyzed automated stock trading but has yet to 
explore the related risks of consumer AIs in any sustained manner.17 Yet by-
products of consumer financial activity, like stock market volatility, have 
contributed to the nation’s largest financial crises. By many accounts, mort-
gages (and the financial instruments derived from them) triggered the Great 
Recession.18 Also, “[b]ank runs are the Achilles’ heel of banking,”19 and as 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. See infra Sections II.B, III.D. 
 14. Interview with a Former Bank Executive (July 2018) (“We have been talking about 
what you are describing as ‘hyperswitching’ for a while.”). 
 15. For examples of such policy proposals, see infra Section II.B. 
 16. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1038 (2015); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 
680, 711 (2013); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018); Saule 
T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 411, 430 (2011); Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service 
Providers as Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988284 [https://perma.cc/8BBT-9SK2]. 
 17. The potential systemic risk of AIs’ consumer financial advice has been alluded to 
only in passing. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 2. 
 18. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How 
Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1539, 1555–61 (2015); Jonathan Macey et. al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Apply-
ing Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 806 (2009) (“The role of sub-
prime mortgage lending in the current crisis was played by stock speculation and bank runs 
during the Great Depression . . . .”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. REV. 209, 210 (2008) (identifying the mortgage crisis as a 
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the Great Depression loomed, customers panicked that their money would 
disappear, causing them to try to withdraw their funds.20 AIs create the pos-
sibility of a new type of bank run—one that is technologically coordinated 
rather than driven by panic—if they were to direct millions of consumers to 
switch banks in pursuit of higher interest rates or a better smartphone inter-
face. 
Outside of finance, business failures can signal beneficial competition. If 
business distress is widespread enough, however, hyperswitching could pro-
duce sizeable costs, such as unemployment expenditures. Additionally, tax-
payers have spent billions of dollars bailing out distressed industries, such as 
automobile manufacturers.21 Although the merits of such bailouts can be de-
bated, since the Great Recession scholars have increasingly concluded that 
events in the real economy have a stronger link to financial crises than was 
previously understood. The costs of government expenditures on industry 
volatility, and the risks of broader crises, are currently omitted from policy 
analyses of AIs. 
None of this should be taken to predict any particular sequence of events 
or to estimate the magnitude of hyperswitching. The task of financial stabil-
ity regulators and scholars is not necessarily to predict the next crisis, or even 
to make the case that any trigger is likely to cause a crisis. Although there is 
little doubt that “there will be another crisis,”22 it is impossible to know be-
forehand the chance that any particular innovation will serve as the trigger, 
and many identified risks will never materialize.23 Instead, the task is to im-
prove risk monitoring, which includes minimizing theoretical blind spots. 
The brightest scholars and most revered financial regulators have too often 
resisted close examination of new triggers that (inevitably) appeared unlikely 
and unfamiliar until they caused a crisis.24 Hyperswitching shares sufficient 
 
trigger in the 2008 financial crisis). The causes of the crisis were multitudinous and are still 
debated. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 1991–95 (2014) (book review). 
 19. See JONATHAN MCMILLAN, THE END OF BANKING: MONEY, CREDIT, AND THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION 38 (2014); infra Section III.C 
 20. Gary Richardson, Banking Panics of 1930–31, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_panics_1930_31 [https://perma.cc/
7BD8-EWQQ]. 
 21. See infra Section III.C.3. 
 22. JAMIE DIMON, DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS 32 (2015), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/JPMC-AR2014-
LetterToShareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVF3-QZVV]. 
 23. Terje Aven & Ortwin Renn, On Risk Defined As an Event Where the Outcome Is Un-
certain, 12 J. RISK RES. 1, 9 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy, Knightian Uncertainty, Systemic Risk 
Regulation, and the Limits of Judicial Review, SSRN 28 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944297 [https://perma.cc/C85E-XVNP]. 
 24. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Great Crash of 2008 and the Reform of Econom-
ics, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1205, 1206–07 (2009) (“On 7 September 2006, Nouriel Roubini, an 
economics professor at New York University, told International Monetary Fund economists 
that the USA was facing a collapse in housing prices, sharply declining consumer confidence 
822 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:815 
characteristics with past crises to, at least, merit consideration in a regulatory 
framework necessarily invested in identifying speculative threats to financial 
stability.25 
This discussion of downsides reveals a paradox: regulatory failures to 
help automate markets could have unintended stability benefits. If so, one 
response could simply be to do nothing and thereby allow sellers and mis-
guided laws to stifle AIs. Although that path forward cannot be ruled out as 
the best option, it also has risks. Without legal reforms, AIs would be more 
dependent on working with sellers, which would facilitate the cooptation of 
potential consumer allies into agents for rent maximization. In the alterna-
tive, the absence of a deliberate and informed AI policy enables AIs to shape 
the law to their preference. In theory, by helping people make better deci-
sions, AIs bring markets closer to “perfect competition,” an influential law 
and economics concept that motivates many laws.26 When policymakers 
have acted deliberately based on those models, they have supported digital 
intermediaries, such as by seeking the disclosure of machine-readable data 
from both private entities and public agencies.27 Moreover, several of the ten 
richest U.S. companies also have the motivation and capabilities to lobby for 
pro-AI policies.28 Thus, policymakers are unlikely to prevent AIs’ ascendan-
cy simply by ignoring them because AI developers can make a strong intel-
lectual and political case for their importance. Instead, it makes sense from 
both a theoretical and practical standpoint to develop more accurate models 
for understanding the direction in which powerful forces are moving mar-
kets. If nonaction is to be the policy choice, it should be deliberate and in-
formed. 
 
and a recession. Homeowners would default on mortgages, the mortgage-backed securities 
market would unravel and the global financial system would seize up. . . . Economist Anirvan 
Banerji responded that Roubini’s predictions did not make use of mathematical models and 
dismissed his warnings . . . .”). In 2002, Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy had identified 
widespread mortgage market problems, but their work was largely ignored until the subprime 
mortgage crisis had materialized, even though the subprime mortgage dynamics they identified 
ultimately contributed to the Great Recession of the late 2000s. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patri-
cia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1255, 1286 (2002). 
 25. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure 68 (Vanderbilt Law Sch., Research 
Paper No. 63, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3070270 
[https://perma.cc/RA6D-R8A3] (describing rate regulation as an instance of experts seeking to 
make markets “mimic the pricing structure and efficient resource allocation that would prevail 
under perfect competition”). 
 27. See infra Section II.B. 
 28. Kenneth Kiesnoski, The Top 10 U.S. Companies by Market Capitalization, CNBC 
(Mar. 8, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/08/the-top-10-us-companies-by-
market-capitalization.html#slide=2 [https://perma.cc/4HKP-9J6C]; Maggie McGrath, A Peek 
Inside Apple, Google and Amazon’s New Capitol Hill Lobbying Coalition, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2015, 
5:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2015/11/09/a-peek-inside-apple-
google-and-amazons-new-capitol-hill-lobbying-coalition [https://perma.cc/2XMV-UXRT]. 
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The Article’s final contribution is to show that the regulatory framework 
could be updated for a more comprehensive treatment of automated com-
merce. Coase’s objects of analysis, like the objects of many who succeeded 
him, were largely microeconomic and largely in the real economy, such as 
the appropriate location of a factory or the function of individual cattle and 
crop markets.29 Those concerns have largely remained intellectually discon-
nected from the more macroeconomic and institutional downsides identified 
in this Article, such as contributors to recessions, managerial decisions about 
corporate finance, the speed of market intermediaries, and the volatility of 
firm failures—issues that are more the purview of financial regulation.30 Fi-
nancial regulation and its macroeconomic concerns have long stood separat-
ed from other areas of legal scholarship,31 while law and economics has 
mostly focused on microeconomic topics.32 
The regulatory framework reflects this academic separation. The prima-
ry regulator of AIs and the real economy, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), is charged with consumer protection and antitrust but does not have 
a macroeconomic stability or significant financial regulation mandate.33 Un-
like trade regulators, financial regulators pay great attention to the speed of 
the stock market and the asset structure of firms, due in part to the belief 
that when one large bank fails, “the world’s financial system can collapse like 
a row of dominoes.”34 The oversight of AIs is, in short, hindered by regulato-
ry and analytic paradigms that have yet to adjust to modern markets that are 
far more technologically and financially intermediated than at the time of 
Coase.35 
 
 29. See Coase, supra note 8, at 5–6, 41–42. Subsequent generations of scholars applied 
the law and economics analysis to financial products such as mortgages and credit cards. See, 
e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29. 
 31. Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving 
Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
129, 130, 156 (2015) (“[I]n many ways administrative law and financial regulation now stand 
poles apart.”). 
 32. Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions 1, 7–
8 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 576, Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 559, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828352 [https://perma.cc/EAG6-
8D9K] (observing that “law and economics” would be more aptly named “law and microeco-
nomics”). 
 33. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 6, 38 Stat. 717, 721–22 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). The FTC does play a minor 
role in consumer protection in finance, but primary authority was transferred to the CFPB. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322(a)(2), 
5491(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 34. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008). 
 35. Cf. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 630 (2015) (argu-
ing that intermediaries’ institutional arrangements are inconsistent with Coase’s transaction 
cost assumptions). 
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The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of AIs 
and distinguishes between marketplace AIs such as Amazon, which double 
as sellers of consumer products, and informer AIs such as Google, which 
may solely provide information. Part II considers how firms might prevent 
AIs from taking hold and the laws that can block that behavior. A range of 
behavior by incumbents—including colluding on prices, excluding AIs from 
crucial data, and making it more difficult for consumers to exit—might un-
dermine consumer switching. 
Part III then discusses the possibility that AIs, when widely adopted, 
might produce significant macroeconomic costs and risks. The inquiry looks 
at both the financial economy and the real economy, drawing on historical 
turbulence of the Great Depression, the Great Recession, stock market flash 
crashes, and the high-profile bankruptcies in brick-and-mortar retail. Part 
IV concludes by considering the implications. Market analyses should as-
sume that welfare-enhancing hyperswitching is possible and use slow switch-
ing as a signal of possible barriers to more efficient markets. Greater 
accuracy could also be obtained by factoring in the costs from either 
hyperswitching volatility or the inefficient managerial moves that such a 
possibility will cause. From a policy perspective, there is a need to bring 
more micro, real-economy factors into financial regulators’ systemic risk 
analyses. There is a corresponding benefit from bringing more macro and 
financial factors into trade regulators’ transactional analyses. Specific tools, 
such as prudential stress tests of hyperswitching disruption, regulatory mon-
itoring of AIs, and a stock-market style pause button for AI mass advice are 
also considered. A more complete diagnosis of AI commerce points to con-
crete reforms of the regulatory state that could safeguard an economy in-
creasingly steered by automated processes. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF AUTOMATED COMMERCE MARKET DYNAMICS 
The market foundations are in place for AIs to take over significant por-
tions of consumer switching. Scholars predict that soon AIs will “us[e] data 
to predict consumers’ preferences, choosing the products or services to pur-
chase, negotiating and executing the transaction, and even automatically 
forming coalitions of buyers to secure optimal terms and conditions. Human 
decisionmaking could be completely bypassed.”36 Already, internet interme-
diaries’ convenience has proved alluring, despite shortcomings. Millions of 
Americans shop online through Amazon despite the fact that they could save 
money by combing through other websites’ options or visiting stores in per-
son.37 Paypal holds over $13 billion in customers’ accounts, including in the 
money-transfer app Venmo, despite the fact that those deposits would not be 
 
 36. Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 310, 312. 
 37. Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But Its Pricing 
Algorithm Doesn’t, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/amazon-says-it-puts-customers-first-but-its-pricing-algorithm-doesnt [https://perma.
cc/AGH2-X627]. 
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insured if Paypal were to fail.38 People are delegating ever more personal 
tasks to algorithms, such as finding the best driving path39 and deciding 
which Facebook post to view.40 Robo-advisers are investing billions of dol-
lars on behalf of consumers through automated trading.41 
This Part provides a taxonomy of the two basic types of AIs—informers, 
like Google, and marketplaces, like Amazon. Both categories will generally 
be marked by a common set of traits: continual searching, delegated automa-
tion, network effects, and scientific personalization. 
A. The AI Business Model 
Given that data is now one of the most valuable assets in the world, AIs 
could make money solely by collecting, analyzing, and selling the data they 
collect from transactions. There are two main models likely to unfold: the 
informer model of Google, Microsoft, and Apple, and the seller-adviser 
model of Amazon. The key difference is that Google, Apple, and Microsoft 
do not sell most end goods or services apart from some core subset of tech-
nology products. To be clear, Google, Apple, and Microsoft are not com-
pletely neutral parties. European antitrust officials have ruled, for instance, 
that Google crushed direct competitors—other information websites—by 
essentially erasing them from search results.42 Classification as an informer 
does not mean that an AI is completely neutral and unbiased in the infor-
mation it provides, nor that it will always serve consumers’ best interests. 
But Google does not earn a cut of the price paid when a consumer ulti-
mately purchases a product after using a Google search, and it does not re-
ceive direct payment for placing certain search results above others (unless 
clearly marked as advertisements). Google can earn considerable revenues 
solely through collecting data and selling advertisements. Additionally, many 
consumers will continue to make decisions for some product categories.43 
For those remaining human-driven purchases, which will inevitably amount 
to a substantial portion of the economy, Google’s AI will be able to use a 
model analogous to its search: return the AI’s recommended short list of 
 
 38. Telis Demos, PayPal Isn’t a Bank, but It May Be the New Face of Banking, WALL 
STREET J. (June 1, 2016, 5:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-banking-evolves-fintech-
emerges-from-the-branch-1464806411 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 39. Noam Bardin, Keeping Cities Moving—How Waze Works, MEDIUM (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@noambardin/keeping-cities-moving-how-waze-works-4aad066c7bfa 
[https://perma.cc/8HAE-CRTQ]. 
 40. AJ Agrawal, What Do Social Media Algorithms Mean for You?, FORBES (Apr. 20, 
2016, 6:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ajagrawal/2016/04/20/what-do-social-media-
algorithms-mean-for-you/#7962a3aa5152 [https://perma.cc/6RM8-J7GT]. 
 41. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-
Advisers Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 98–99, 106–07 (2018). 
 42. See Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion in E.U. Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-fine.html 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 43. See infra Section III.B.3. 
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product options and then include a clearly marked “advertisement” product 
listing alongside. Concerns will arise about informers skewing seemingly ob-
jective digital advice to favor advertisers.44 But informers could deploy a 
business model that does not immediately benefit from prioritizing one sell-
er over another or from influencing the consumer to pay a higher price.45 
Amazon, in contrast, is more of a marketplace in that it has taken steps 
to sell an array of goods and services to consumers. It can also earn money 
from data, like Google. But unlike Google, it gets a cut of the consumer’s ul-
timate purchase on items sold by third parties and all of the purchase price 
on its own goods. As a result, it has a direct monetary incentive to ensure 
that the consumer pays a higher price, especially on the products it owns and 
the services it provides.46 It also has an incentive to direct consumers away 
from products sold outside the Amazon marketplace, such as those exclu-
sively sold at Walmart or independent manufacturers. Google is far more 
disinterested than Amazon, from a direct revenue perspective, as to whether 
consumers go to Walmart, Amazon, or some other seller to purchase a given 
item or service. 
Both models have competitive advantages. Amazon may undermine in-
former AIs by refusing to sell its goods to them or using laws to block access 
to its prices.47 But AIs’ success will depend on being seen as neutral, which 
favors informers. It is possible that one of these models will win out or that 
both will operate in substantial coexistence. 
B. Common Features 
AIs will continuously monitor for better deals, autonomously spend on 
behalf of consumers, widely leverage network effects, and scientifically tailor 
advice. An AI’s success in pursuing these features will help determine its ul-
timate market share, societal benefits, and need for regulation. 
Continuous help. AIs will offer the option of monitoring market devel-
opments continuously. Some digital intermediaries today provide a version 
of this service. Google Flights, for instance, offers to “track prices” for a spe-
cific itinerary, sending emails when prices drop.48 Eventually, AI customers 
should be able to choose whether to enable a similar feature for many other 
categories of spending. The AI then will look for new products and market 
developments nonstop. The customer will be able to decide how often to re-
 
 44. See, e.g., Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 5, at 1290–93. 
 45. Informers’ market power could instead raise advertising costs that sellers pass on to 
consumers. 
 46. Of course, Amazon must weigh the risk of losing customers by charging too high of 
a price. But retail customers weigh other considerations and often do not compare prices. See 
Van Loo, supra note 6, at 1345–47. 
 47. See infra Section II.B. 
 48. See Track Flights and Prices, GOOGLE: TRAVEL HELP, 
https://support.google.com/travel/answer/6235879?hl=en&ref_topic=2475360 [https://
perma.cc/8UAV-LMML]. 
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ceive alerts. This feature can save consumers considerable time searching, as 
it would otherwise be necessary to regularly check thousands of sites to find 
the best option. 
Delegated automation. Even if consumers know there are better market 
options, they may not switch due to the burden of decisionmaking or the 
time it takes to change their behavior—such as opening and closing ac-
counts.49 For many transactions, AIs will enable consumers to delegate the 
ultimate decision and switching to the assistant. This delegation makes it 
more likely that they will benefit from the market’s best offerings. 
For a large portion of consumers, convenience is one of the most im-
portant factors in shopping, and consumers are willing to rely on automated 
transactions to advance convenience. Automated renewals have long existed 
for subscriptions, a practice that has moved from print magazines to various 
online services, such as Netflix and Apple Music.50 Physical-goods subscrip-
tions are also proliferating, led by Amazon’s “Subscribe & Save” service, 
which sends a set quantity of household goods at regular intervals.51 Such 
services are a growing part of Amazon’s sales, and other companies are roll-
ing out similar functions.52 
A key part of this feature will be the ability to open and close new ac-
counts. Online companies like BillFixers and JustOnePay already offer simi-
lar account management services, including handling excess fees, payments, 
new account openings, and cancellations.53 Those services, however, still rely 
on human help.54 The next step will be for the AI to take over the entire pur-
chase process on an ongoing basis in categories where the consumer dele-
gates authority, such as keeping the food supply stocked. The AI will decide 
where to buy the products, evaluate their price and quality, and update the 
consumer along the way or give preapproval notifications if preferred. As the 
“tectonic plates underpinning the business world [shift] from the transac-
tional economy to the subscription economy,”55 consumers will become 
 
 49. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 50. John Warrillow, 5 Giants Adopt the Subscription Model to Keep Ahead of Upstart 
Rivals, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2015, 4:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/
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 51. Brian X. Chen, Subscribe and Save on Amazon? Don’t Count on It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/technology/personaltech/subscribe-and-save-
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 52. Eugene Kim, Amazon Jumps After Smashing Earnings, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018, 3:26 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/26/amazon-earnings-q1-2018.html [https://perma.cc/
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 53. Kelli B. Grant, These Start-Ups Let You Skip Customer Service Woes, CNBC (May 4, 
2016, 10:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/04/outsource-bill-negotiations-and-
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 54. See id. 
 55. See Warrillow, supra note 50. 
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more accustomed to being less actively involved in more of their expendi-
tures. 
Network effects. In most digital markets, the more people use a product, 
the more valuable it becomes—a dynamic known as a network effect.56 Face-
book, for instance, is far less attractive if almost nobody you know uses it, 
but once your friends and family participate, the site has much more to offer. 
In a weaker kind of network effect, shopping assistants will benefit from hav-
ing more people using them. More people will provide more data to analyze 
and will hone predictions. It will also increase the algorithm’s ability to iden-
tify similar consumer patterns in subsets of its customers, thereby providing 
better advice.57 
Network effects will shape AIs’ development in important ways. The AI 
landscape is likely to mimic other digital markets’ extremely high concentra-
tion, in which as few as two or three companies capture the bulk of the mar-
ket. Google drives 89% of internet searches, Facebook reaches 95% of young 
internet users through its various products, Amazon has 75% of book sales, 
and Microsoft and Apple supply 95% of desktop operating systems.58 
This expected AI concentration could, in theory, be market specific. A 
number of digital intermediaries currently focus on a specific market, such 
as travel or finance.59 It is possible that an AI dominating finance, such as 
NerdWallet or Mint, could be different from an AI capturing the market for 
retail goods and other products. 
A more likely possibility is that a small number of AIs will reach cross-
market dominance. As Google CEO Sundar Pichai wrote recently, describing 
a cross-market model, “Your phone should proactively bring up the right 
documents, schedule and map your meetings, let people know if you are late, 
suggest responses to messages, handle your payments and expenses, etc.”60 
Moreover, the big technology companies already have a head start that 
would be difficult for smaller companies to overcome. Hundreds of millions 
of iPhones have Apple’s AI, Siri, which is regularly used for basic tasks like 
setting appointments or reminders.61 Amazon’s Alexa can already order piz-
za or an Uber by voice command.62 These and other AIs are already sitting 
 
 56. See generally ROMAN BECK, Network Effect Theory, in THE NETWORK(ED) ECONOMY 
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 57. See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 58. Ip, supra note 11. 
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(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/magazine/how-alexa-fits-into-amazons-
prime-directive.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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on troves of data relevant to consumer spending. Due to network and win-
ner-take-all market advantages that this data will provide, the convenience of 
dealing with a single AI, and the ease with which large tech companies can 
make acquisitions of any startup competitors, it would not be surprising if 
two or three of the existing big tech companies ultimately direct the future of 
automated commerce. 
Scientific personalization. After consumers voluntarily provide AIs with 
passwords to their various online accounts, and after serving a given con-
sumer for long enough, AIs can access extensive personal data, including 
past transactions, web searches, and social networks. Many consumers will 
also consciously help the assistants improve by providing input, whether 
through a five-star rating system or spoken reactions like, “Siri, next time I 
buy hand soap remind me to choose one that has moisturizer.” 
With these rich personal data points, the assistant will then scan millions 
of other customers’ purchases and reviews, including those available online, 
which would take too long for a human to peruse. The extensive personal 
data will enable the AI to prioritize the reviews and habits of consumers with 
similar profiles. Already, many companies successfully use similar tools to 
heavily customize recommendations. Facebook leverages extensive 
knowledge about our networks and prior clicks to display news tailored to 
our interests.63 Services such as Pandora and Netflix receive subscribers’ in-
put and use it to make future recommendations.64 
The AI will also learn over time through experience by training on the 
vast data repositories of consumers’ personal transactional histories.65 For 
instance, machines might analyze only the first five years of a consumer’s 
purchases in a ten-year database to predict what happened in the last five 
years. If a given prediction is incorrect, it can be adjusted and tried again 
millions of times, until the algorithm learns the predictors of changed behav-
ior for that consumer. 
The AI can then test such algorithms on small subsets of their millions 
of consumers, who become regular participants in real-world experiments. 
Moving forward, consumers would be able to benefit not only from their 
own past mistakes remembered by their AI but also from those of other con-
sumers with similar tastes.66 People have always looked to others for ideas on 
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what to buy and how to find the best deals, and AIs make it possible to lever-
age millions of consumers rather than two or three friends. 
Shopping assistants thereby combine the wisdom of crowds, the power 
of information technology, and the precision of scientific methods into an 
iterative learning process. As a senior Google executive described it, the 
company’s algorithms “should know what you want and tell it to you before 
you ask the question.”67 Once an AI becomes capable of saving people time 
and money, in addition to knowing what they want to buy better than the 
individual, it could gain enough broad appeal to drive large portions of an-
nual national consumer spending. 
II. THE UPSIDES OF AI PROTECTION 
Laws will influence the extent to which consumers delegate spending to 
AIs and how much that delegation improves consumer welfare. Since the 
consumer-related literature has focused on the regulation of digital interme-
diaries, this Part considers how the law can support AIs in the face of re-
sistance from current product market leaders.68 Such AI protection, which 
can be situated within the dominant paradigm for market regulation, will al-
so influence whether the informer AI business model exemplified by Google 
wins out over the marketplace model of Amazon. 
A. The Theory Supporting Digitally Perfected Competition 
From a policy perspective, AIs’ appeal lies in their potential to reduce 
barriers to perfect competition. In so doing, they could save consumers con-
siderable time and money, as well as boost the economy. Because the trans-
actional efficiency gains would be enormous, it would make sense for 
policymakers to support laws that strengthen AIs.69 
1. The Policy Push Toward Perfect Competition 
Few ideas have had greater influence on the law than Coase’s observa-
tions about transaction costs. Transaction costs lack a universally supported 
definition, but I use them here to refer to the time and resources needed to 
find and execute a purchase.70 As a simple example, consumers spend both 
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time and money just to visit grocery stores to learn which products and pric-
es are available. 
In the 1960s, Coase pointed out what is now broadly understood to be 
correct, that pervasively adopted analytic models were flawed because they 
assumed zero transaction costs.71 In the real world, transaction costs are sub-
stantial.72 Moreover, he argued that this mistaken assumption of no transac-
tion costs had led to incorrect legal analysis.73 Since this revelation, 
generations of scholars have emphasized the lowering of transaction costs as 
the highest priority in designing legal rules.74 Removing transaction costs 
benefits society by increasing efficiency.75 
The Coasian paradigm shift forms part of a larger series of law and eco-
nomics developments. An assumption of zero transaction costs is one of the 
features of perfect competition, an early theoretical market structure that has 
heavily influenced economic modeling.76 By adopting laws that reduce trans-
action costs, policymakers move real-world markets closer to the hypothet-
ical model of perfect competition. Neoclassical economists believed that 
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perfect competition was better for consumers, because they pay the lowest 
prices and benefit from maximal choice among attractive products, and bet-
ter for society, due to improved economic welfare from market efficiency.77 
Subsequent work illustrated and expanded the extent of the gap between 
real markets and perfect competition. Perfect competition also assumed that 
markets supplied sufficient information for consumers to make effective de-
cisions. George Akerlof, among others, challenged this assumption by point-
ing out that in the used-car market buyers know that lemons exist, but many 
are unable to tell which cars are the lemons due to information asymme-
tries.78 Consequently, the market fails to adequately reward those who sell 
higher-quality cars, making buyers and sellers worse off.79 These develop-
ments contributed strong law and economics support for the view that regu-
lation may be warranted when “imperfect information has produced 
noncompetitive prices and terms.”80 
Behavioral economics research challenged a different longstanding as-
sumption: rationality. Traditional law and economics theory assumed that 
consumers make rational decisions, roughly meaning decisions that advance 
consumers’ interests given the options available. In recent decades, building 
upon the work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, re-
searchers have shown that people instead make systematic errors.81 In one 
influential experiment that implicates switching, Kahneman and Tversky 
created a laboratory setting with zero transaction costs and randomly as-
signed participants to have either mugs or money with which they could 
purchase mugs.82 Whether the participants started with the mug had a heavy 
influence on the price at which they were willing to transact. Whereas the 
Coase theorem would have predicted that about 50% of the participants 
would trade, only 10% did so.83 While the precise reasons for people’s ac-
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tions are often unclear and behavioral economics is still developing,84 psy-
chologists have begun to show how people tend to estimate poorly, have ex-
cess confidence in their decisions, and face difficulties processing even basic 
numerical decisions.85 These diverse human decisionmaking shortcomings 
can prevent transactions that would not only be in those decisionmakers’ 
best interests but could also increase efficiency. A range of scholars have, as a 
result, offered the law as a means to lessen the harms from irrationality.86 
2. AIs as Agents of Perfect Competition 
Although the prospect of moving toward perfect competition has ani-
mated policy reform for decades, the results have been disappointing. De-
spite prices and products available at the click of a button in the information 
age, the evidence suggests that “[c]onsumers often fail to choose the best 
price because they search too little, become confused comparing prices, 
and/or show excessive inertia through too little switching away from past 
choices or default options.”87 Although information technologies lowered 
some types of transaction costs and information asymmetries,88 there is little 
evidence that these pro-consumer innovations have kept up with firms’ abil-
ity to strategically profit from exploiting switching costs, information asym-
metries, and decision biases.89 As a result, even if the decision not to search 
may be rational for any given consumer, consumers often pay considerably 
more than they would if markets were closer to perfect competition. Various 
studies have estimated that consequently consumers pay 8% more on cell 
phones,90 almost 40% more on credit cards,91 and 22% more even on basic 
goods such as aspirin.92 
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phone, and vacation time-sharing industries” and concluding that “for all types of goods firms 
introduce switching costs and charge back-loaded fees”). 
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Part of the problem is that it still takes considerable quantitative skills 
and time to visit various websites, locate the right product at each website, 
and create mathematical equations to compare complex pricing packages.93 
Amazon does not allow users to sort by the price per unit, instead requiring 
people to look through hundreds of items to find the best unit price.94 One 
study found that in highly commodified electronic parts markets in which 
alternative prices were a click away, consumers paid 6–9% higher prices be-
cause sellers were able to make product comparison difficult by including 
longer descriptions and requiring extra clicks to determine shipping fees.95 
Companies have also continued to find ways to hide costs, such as airlines 
charging for carry-on luggage or manufacturers lowering the price of a 
printer while charging more for ink cartridges.96 By making it more difficult 
to compare the overall price, such as the lifetime cost of purchasing a given 
printer, sellers are able to make consumers less attuned to the full price they 
pay.97 Overall, the time and energy needed to find the best deal still discour-
age comparison and switching even in the information age. 
Legal interventions aimed at providing people with the information they 
need, or behaviorally nudging them toward better decisions, have often 
failed.98 This is at least partly because consumers tend not to use this new in-
formation or respond to this behavioral nudge as policymakers might ex-
pect.99 Legislators are also reluctant to intervene in ways that reduce choice, 
out of concern that doing so would infringe on consumers’ liberty inter-
ests.100 
Given the failure of past technological and policy interventions, why 
would AIs be any different? It is by no means certain that they will be. But as 
I argue below, the law has held back digital intermediaries’ ability to help 
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 99. See id. at 705. 
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consumers. Thus, with the right legal framework in place, AIs could very 
well adapt to fast-moving sales strategies at a speed that bureaucrats or law-
makers cannot. Additionally, by allowing the consumer to opt out of most of 
the decisionmaking and transaction processes, AIs could remove many of 
the barriers left in place by prior generations of digital intermediaries. 
To see further why significant AI benefits are a theoretical possibility, it 
helps to understand more about how AIs would interact with some key cur-
rent barriers to perfect competition. A diligent consumer might look at five 
products on average before making a purchase, but AIs could look at thou-
sands. Unlike the consumer, the AI would easily factor in a reasonable esti-
mate of future costs of the ink cartridges, durability, and repair expenses, 
drawing on data from millions of other consumers who have made printer 
and ink purchases in the past to provide this consumer with a sophisticated, 
full comparison of different printers over the course of a consumer’s life. A 
manufacturer whose products have consistently proven more expensive de-
spite a lower initial printer purchase price would see sales plummet once the 
AIs came to that conclusion. The possibility of losing future sales could then 
deter such practices. 
AIs could help even with traditionally sticky products. Getting a mort-
gage quote and applying for a credit card have historically meant filling out 
large volumes of paperwork. More than two-thirds of credit card applica-
tions are denied, which discourages applications.101 These time investments 
for uncertain results help explain why consumers often take out credit cards 
with an initial offer of a low teaser rate, intending to switch later but ulti-
mately staying put even when they could save considerably by moving to a 
credit card with lower rates and fees.102 The burden of research, application, 
and analysis helps explain why almost half of prospective home buyers get 
only one mortgage quote and why most are slow to refinance, potentially 
costing them tens of thousands of dollars in higher rates.103 Due to various 
fees for early termination and installation, the costs of switching Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) can be in the hundreds of dollars, not to mention 
the considerable time that would need to be spent to switch.104 
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Market-specific digital intermediaries like Credit Karma have stated 
their intention to use their knowledge of an individual consumer’s credit 
score, income, and other information to predict with close to 100% accuracy 
whether a credit card company or lender will accept a given application.105 
As Quicken Loans put it in a recent Super Bowl ad, the company seeks to do 
for loans what “the Internet did for buying music and plane tickets and 
shoes . . . PUSH BUTTON GET MORTGAGE.”106 
Perhaps most important of all is that AIs can remove the need for con-
sumers to do anything other than say “yes.” Research suggests that a small 
amount of time needed to transfer an account can serve as an unexpectedly 
high barrier for consumer switching even when the consumer may have a 
strong preference for a different product.107 By all but removing the need to 
think or act, AIs will raise consumer protection questions to ensure that the 
consumer is not being misled by the intermediary.108 Assuming the down-
sides are managed, however, the consumer welfare and efficiency advances 
are potentially enormous.109 The dominant legal paradigm today—which 
prioritizes reducing transaction costs—would, in theory, support legal re-
forms that make those AI advances possible. 
B. Legal and Market Battlegrounds 
The law of automated commerce is relatively new, evolving, and under-
theorized. It is uncertain the extent to which the intellectual framework sup-
porting AIs will translate into real-world policies. Early signs have been 
mixed, with key U.S. policymakers showing support for AIs but advancing 
the law more slowly than their counterparts in other countries.110 The laws 
governing four types of business behavior will have especially great influence 
on AIs’ ability to reduce transaction costs: data access, customer exit, obfus-
cation, and collusion. 
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1. Data Obstruction 
Access to data is crucial for AIs to help consumers shop, but sellers can 
block digital intermediaries from obtaining data. The law can help in differ-
ent ways, depending on whether the data in question is general (product-
specific) or personal (customer-specific). 
Product information. Counterintuitively in the information age, busi-
nesses can block access to market information that exists openly on the web, 
such as Amazon’s or airlines’ prices. To give up-to-date advice, AIs would 
need to monitor price and product changes on various websites, a process 
called scraping.111 Online sellers have used the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA) and other laws to forbid third parties from digitally collecting 
such information.112 Autoslash, for instance, is a third-party service that re-
portedly helped lower rental car prices by about 25% by alerting customers 
when prices were lowered.113 Two of the leading rental car agencies, Enter-
prise and Avis, concluded that the service was harmful to their business and 
refused to let Autoslash show their car availability.114 The information is 
freely available on the web, but without approval, Autoslash—a small 
startup—risks getting sued by large corporations. 
The laws used to block access to information were not intended to do so. 
Instead, lawmakers adopted the CFAA, for example, to deter website hack-
ers.115 As a result, the use of such laws to deter AIs rests on shaky legal and 
intellectual grounds.116 Some of the more recent cases suggest that courts are 
becoming more skeptical of companies, such as Ticketmaster, Oracle, and 
LinkedIn, which are blocking third-party access that might help consum-
ers.117 
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Additionally, large companies won the early, prominent data-restriction 
cases mostly against resource-deprived startups, like eBay’s victory against 
the now-defunct Bidder’s Edge.118 If a larger company desired data access, 
the result could be different. Amazon reportedly regularly scrapes competi-
tors’ prices without court challenge.119 It is possible that more deep-pocketed 
informer AIs could overcome the remaining shaky legal barriers to data ac-
cess. 
It is also worth noting that the law is not AIs’ last option. Consumer par-
ticipation may provide an avenue outside the legal process to obtain data. 
Millions of consumers send real-time prices to GasBuddy, which then helps 
drivers across the nation know which nearby gas station offers the best 
deal.120 Microsoft, Apple, or Google could require users to share purchase 
information as it passes through phones or computers as an alternative 
means of AI access. 
Despite these possible technology- and market-driven developments, 
AIs’ surest path to data independence would be through courts refusing to 
continue to allow misappropriated laws to block access and through legisla-
tures passing new laws to promote access. Pre–digital era disclosures are 
common. For instance, many states have laws requiring stores such as Target 
and Walmart to post price per unit on the shelves to make it easier to com-
pare differently sized items.121 Laws compelling sellers to provide data to AIs 
would advance related goals of facilitating price and product comparison. 
Personal data. Customer-specific data will be crucial to tailoring advice 
and will drive consumers to give AIs access to online accounts. For instance, 
millions of customers at Citibank, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase 
have given AI financial assistants like NerdWallet their passwords so that au-
tomated bots can log in and collect bank transaction records.122 Banks re-
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sponded by adapting their account systems to block the bots.123 Airlines 
similarly denied online account entry to startups that wanted to help con-
sumers manage their airline rewards programs.124 The companies cited pri-
vacy concerns, or accidental blocking due to internal systems updates,125 but 
those explanations must be viewed with some skepticism because the inter-
mediaries pose a competitive threat. 
Scholars have identified the need to address this personal data inaccessi-
bility without regard to automated commerce. In response to consumers’ 
difficulty in selecting the best cell phone plan available, Professors Bar-Gill 
and Stone suggest that cell phone carriers be required to give consumers 
their usage data in spreadsheet form so that third parties could advise on the 
plan of best fit.126 The United States has mostly declined to compel business-
es to share personal account data with third parties when consumers request 
such access. Congress tasked the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) with studying whether to compel banks to provide such information, 
but the CFPB decided not to do so.127 It instead issued voluntary “principles” 
for sharing such data.128 Those guidelines could exert soft influence, but they 
leave banks with great leeway to thwart intermediary access. 
Other countries have taken a more active role in providing consumer in-
termediaries with personal account access. In the United Kingdom, some 
grocery stores give consumers access to their spending habits from rewards 
program databases.129 Europe recently passed sweeping privacy legislation, 
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), that requires 
companies across the economy to share such information with consumers 
when asked.130 Personal and general information laws may prove determina-
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tive of AIs’ ability to help consumers by making it less likely that informer 
AIs either lose out to marketplace AIs like Amazon or are coopted by sellers 
to gain data access. 
2. Exit Prevention 
Companies might also undermine AIs by making it harder for AIs to au-
tomate consumers’ departure to another company. Common past mecha-
nisms for discouraging exit include contractual termination fees, obstinate 
customer service, and rewards programs.131 In their early years, industry 
leaders such as Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint locked consumers into multiyear 
contracts by imposing penalty clauses of $99 to $200 for exiting early.132 AIs 
in such an industry could still dominate the choices made whenever con-
tracts expire or a new consumer enters. But high termination fees can deter 
otherwise rational switching out of bad contracts—if the market fails to pro-
vide alternatives to those high fees.133 
Companies have leveraged customer service to inflate the time and en-
ergy needed to cancel. Subscription-based services, including gym member-
ships and internet access, sometimes require customers to show up in 
person, wait on the phone for hours, or plead with an insistent employee to 
be able to cancel.134 Comcast, one of the most notorious practitioners of this 
approach, went so far as to refuse to let a man cancel his subscription 
through four calls after his house had burnt down.135 
Customer service barriers are challenging for AIs. It is likely that AIs will 
be able to make the phone call and wait on hold, thereby minimizing the 
amount of time the consumer needs to spend in exiting. But as long as a 
human is required to invest time to exit, such as through a contractual re-
quirement, sellers would still be able to greatly hinder AI-driven exit, since 
“research in behavioral economics indicates that even very small switching 
costs may prevent customers from switching.”136 
Rewards programs also lock consumers in, with over 2.5 billion individ-
ual program memberships existing in 2012.137 They raise the costs of com-
paring various products with multidimensional rewards programs. Scholars 
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have concluded that these practices exploit decision biases to “hurt consum-
ers and reduce social welfare.”138 The law is unlikely to restrict rewards pro-
grams, but with data access the AI should be able to analyze which credit 
card rewards program will ultimately save consumers the most money—the 
one with the $100 annual fee but a generous cash-back program, or the one 
without an annual fee but that offers frequent flyer miles that can be re-
deemed for airline tickets. To the extent consumers irrationally stay in a cur-
rent account because they believe the rewards program is more valuable than 
it is, AIs may make rewards programs less sticky by helping consumers easily 
determine which program is truly in their best interests. 
The law has intervened in various ways to promote customer exit. 
Courts have struck down excessive cell phone termination fees, and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ultimately passed a rule to crack down 
on such practices.139 At the state level, the New York Attorney General fined 
America Online, an ISP, $1.25 million for making it hard to switch “by either 
making the cancellation process so painful for the customers that they could 
not bear to continue, or by simply ignoring their requests.”140 California re-
quires an online cancellation option for any consumer who accepts an auto-
matic or continuous service offer online.141 Comcast now allows customers 
to cancel online nationwide.142 
Thus, seller blocking of exit faces an uphill battle. But it may still be pos-
sible, at least in some industries and jurisdictions, for companies to insist 
contractually that only a human being can cancel. The legal system has yet to 
finish adapting customer-exit doctrine to automated commerce. 
3. Obfuscation 
Many sellers will presumably adopt misperception tactics against AIs 
similar to those they deploy for consumers. Instead of manipulating the hu-
man brain, they will seek to manipulate AI algorithms. Sellers may, for in-
stance, rely on subtle changes in name or product across time or stores. If 
manufacturers were to use different names or valueless design changes for 
essentially the same products at Walmart and Target, it would be harder for 
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the AI to know which store has the best deal.143 Another related technique 
would be to continually introduce new product lines that reflect little if any 
improvement but create the perception that previous versions are now infe-
rior.144 Continual updates would lessen AIs’ ability to use data on prior 
product lines to advise consumers. 
It is unclear how well these strategies will work in markets with consum-
ers relying on AI. To benefit consumers, the AIs need only improve upon 
consumers’ ability to compare. They need not perfect the comparison pro-
cess. Many consumers might outsource purchases even to confused AIs if 
the AIs are less confused than the consumer would be when faced with the 
same set of choices. The more that businesses make their products difficult 
to compare, the more consumers may realize they need help from AIs. In 
other words, business efforts to cause AI misperception by making the mar-
ketplace more confusing may accelerate consumers’ reliance on AIs. 
Additionally, AIs may become widespread even if they do not help con-
sumers pay lower prices or find better products. They might instead become 
popular because of the convenience they provide. Or they might themselves 
benefit from consumers’ mistaken perceptions that the AIs gave better ad-
vice. In that sense, AIs can engage in a digital version of the “seduction by 
contract” that has allowed credit card and mortgage companies to charge 
higher prices through complex choice architecture.145 Choosing the right AI, 
and understanding its full implications, can be analogized to choosing the 
right mortgage or other complex product—thus allowing opportunities for 
overestimating the benefits to the consumer.146 Therefore, sellers’ obfusca-
tion tactics alone will not necessarily block AI adoption, because such obfus-
cation will make it (1) easier for AIs to convince consumers that they need 
help, (2) more likely that consumers need help, and (3) more difficult for the 
consumer to tell whether the AIs’ advice is, in fact, helpful. 
Market forces aside, policymakers have generally sought to improve 
consumer clarity. Behavioral research spawned a multitude of policies aimed 
at nudging consumers to make better choices, but those policies have often 
been unsuccessful because sellers adjust practices quickly and consumers 
may not use disclosed information as intended.147 Unlike with consumers, 
however, the tech companies that offer AIs will be better suited to identify 
the practices that are aimed at undermining AIs and articulating how they 
need policymakers to respond. With AIs as the target for disclosures and 
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 147. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10; Bubb & Pildes, supra note 10. 
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large tech companies as partners in identifying sellers’ latest obfuscation 
strategies, the law may have a better chance at reducing obfuscation. 
4. Collusion 
Scholars have explored the antitrust implications of two or three AIs 
controlling the market, with the concern being that AIs might abuse their 
dominance.148 Scholars have paid less attention to sellers colluding to pre-
vent AIs from functioning. More specifically, by colluding to limit choice, 
sellers can impede AIs’ ability to help consumers.149 If all prices for paper 
towels are the same, for instance, AIs have less of a basis for recommending 
one product over another. Several factors would influence whether such an 
arrangement might come to pass. 
First, more concentrated industries facilitate collusion, and industries 
are overall becoming far more concentrated, with over 75% experiencing an 
increase in concentration over the past twenty years.150 The types of indus-
tries potentially susceptible to digital switching—banking, telecommunica-
tions, and retail—are increasingly dominated by a few large companies.151 
Second, when it is hard to start a company in a given industry, existing play-
ers can collude with less fear that a new entrant will break up their arrange-
ment. Entry barriers have risen in diverse industries for multiple reasons, 
including greater market consolidation152 and the technological investments 
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required to compete.153 Third, the growing use of algorithms by sellers has 
created new mechanisms for collusion. While the Department of Justice has 
prosecuted coconspirators who intentionally used algorithms to fix the price 
of posters sold on Amazon,154 self-learning algorithms instructed to set pric-
es at the most profitable level could on their own deduce that collusion with 
competitors yields the highest profits.155 The algorithms may do so indirect-
ly, such as by fixing their price on an external variable that coincides with 
competitors’ prices.156 
Scholars have proposed updates to address new forms of sellers’ algo-
rithmic collusion.157 But competition law has been slow to adjust to the digi-
tal era.158 Besides the general inertia of the law, antitrust authorities are 
particularly reluctant to intervene in new industries out of a fear of harming 
innovation.159 Those consumer-focused reforms may prove more important 
if sellers become extra motivated to collude out of a desire to undermine AIs. 
Given that AIs will closely track market prices and would arguably be 
harmed by seller price collusion, it is worth considering more closely how to 
bring AIs into the antitrust framework—not just as the targets of enforce-
ment but as potential informants and plaintiffs. 
C. Summary 
Established businesses may impede AIs’ benefits to consumers through a 
number of strategic moves. It is also possible that AIs take hold of markets 
solely out of consumers’ desire for convenience and without actually benefit-
ting consumers in other ways or moving markets toward the basic economic 
model of perfect competition. But with the right legal framework in place, 
AIs could significantly reduce transaction costs by eliminating searching and 
switching costs in some contexts. Most of the business responses discussed 
above are, by traditional economic accounts, inefficient: reducing infor-
mation available, blocking exit, restraining competition, and engaging in 
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wasteful product differentiation.160 Because these activities are inefficient, the 
intellectual paradigm that dominates regulatory policy would support deter-
ring as many of them as possible—assuming a viable intervention existed.161 
But even arguably the most powerful and motivated consumer protection 
agency, the CFPB, failed to act consistent with an intermediary protection 
paradigm when tasked by Congress with making a decision on the matter. In 
short, while the law is entirely unsettled, influential political and intellectual 
forces could enable AIs to bring massive reductions in transaction costs to 
many markets, and thereby tremendous gains to society. Those beneficial re-
sults and the path to them become clearer through a lens of AI protection. 
III. THE RISKS OF HYPERSWITCHING 
We often decide that an outcome is extremely unlikely or impossible, be-
cause we are unable to imagine any chain of events that could cause it to 
occur. The defect, often, is in our imagination. 
     – Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky162 
The discussion so far has addressed the underappreciated intellectual 
and legal shifts that would improve AIs’ ability to become widely adopted. 
This Part turns to the downsides of AIs once they are adopted. The literature 
has focused on the concerns that dominant digital intermediaries might ex-
ercise monopoly power or threaten consumer protection—harms addressed 
by more micro-level governance of AIs. But a broader set of costs and risks, 
many of which require a more macro-level perspective, could result from 
how AIs transform the structure of markets and businesses. The goal of this 
discussion is neither to predict the future nor to estimate the likelihood and 
extent of automated consumer switching. Instead, the goal is to illuminate a 
set of underappreciated dynamics in the coming automation of markets.163 
A. Hyperswitching as a New Form of Disruption 
To understand why AIs might lead to unfamiliar downsides, it is in-
structive to consider how AIs will introduce new types of change into mar-
kets. Assume that a large portion of consumer spending is either heavily 
influenced by, or directly outsourced to, AIs. Assume also that almost all 
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customers use Google and Apple AIs,164 mirroring the markets for cell phone 
operating systems and matching scholars’ predictions that such digital in-
termediaries will be highly concentrated.165 One of the potential results is 
that AIs would have the ability to cause hyperswitching, that is the exit of 
consumers from existing sellers in a significantly faster manner than had 
happened in a pre-AI world. 
For instance, sixty million users might receive an AI alert on their 
phones that a new bank is now paying a higher interest rate, with the AI of-
fering to transfer the users’ funds from their current bank to the new one. Or 
the next time anyone purchases a blender, the AI might reveal that one com-
pany has significantly higher satisfaction from users for the same cost. The 
banks holding existing funds could within a few weeks see millions of cus-
tomers withdraw funds. Major manufacturers of blenders could see sales 
plummet. 
AIs might suddenly advise a large number of consumers to move to a 
new purchaser for three main reasons. The first is a better price. Competitors 
could always try to match price decreases, and many sellers’ first response 
would be to give up any current supracompetitive markups, thus driving 
down profits. Once a given market reaches something close to marginal cost 
pricing, however, any seller with a higher cost structure should prove unable 
to follow the price cuts for long without going out of business. Many indus-
tries have divergent cost structures,166 meaning that a move to marginal cost 
pricing could still result in price-driven switching. 
A second potential driver of customer flight is a more appealing prod-
uct. Prominent examples of broadly attractive product innovations include 
Netflix offering streaming video or cell phones replacing landlines. Innova-
tion can, however, come in small increments and subtler changes, such as 
creating a battery that lasts longer. 
Finally, it is possible that an AI might have some self-interest in direct-
ing consumers to a new product. When two leading travel search engines, 
Orbitz and Expedia, delisted American Airlines from online searches over a 
dispute about increased commissions, the airline lost the equivalent of over 
$100 million annually and quickly caved to the search engines’ demands to 
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pay higher commissions.167 Self-interested AI advice would run the risk of 
undermining users’ trust, but cannot be ruled out.168 
In theory, for these and other reasons, AIs might cause hyperswitching. 
Since the stakes are high, the looming threat of hyperswitching alone could 
change markets and industrial organization. At least one large bank has al-
ready begun emphasizing rewards programs to prevent hyperswitching.169 
Past disruptions and industry turmoil have not generally been seen as 
economically problematic, and indeed are fairly common. The airline and 
auto industries have, for instance, witnessed the bankruptcies of several of 
their largest companies during short timespans.170 The disruption most simi-
lar to AI advisers was the development of electronic commerce. Due partly 
to online competition from the likes of Amazon and Netflix, the retail indus-
try has witnessed considerable institutional failures.171 Several once-
ubiquitous national retailers folded in the 1990s and 2000s, including Circuit 
City in electronics, Borders in books, and Blockbuster in video rental.172 In 
2017 alone, Toys “R” Us, Radio Shack, and Payless Shoes filed for bankrupt-
cy.173 
If the lack of concern about such past disruption is well-founded, it is 
necessary to consider how a shift to automated markets would differ from 
prior industry disruption. Several main differences are worth noting. 
1. Lasting Disruption 
The familiar disruptive innovation model, exemplified by internet retail, 
involved sellers deploying a new technology to lure customers away from ex-
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isting firms.174 Amazon and Netflix needed to take customers away from es-
tablished retailers to earn revenues and deliver their core services—selling 
goods or renting videos.175 
In contrast, replacement of existing sellers or manufacturers is not a 
necessary part of the AI business plan. Google’s Assistant and Apple’s Siri 
can leave all manufacturers and sellers of paper towels in place, for instance, 
while still inserting themselves into every U.S. transaction for paper towels. 
Indeed, in theory, if Google and Siri are the two dominant AIs, they could 
leave Amazon intact as a thriving online marketplace if they simply direct 
customers to purchase from Amazon whenever it offers the best option for a 
given end product. 
Amazon may or may not be able to block Google and Apple AIs from 
knowing its paper towel prices or completing a transaction on Amazon. The 
outcome of that battle depends on legal, technological, and market issues 
that have yet to be resolved.176 But for the present purpose of exploring the 
law and economics analysis of innovation, it suffices to recognize that AIs 
can layer onto an existing marketplace, and thereby help sellers with better 
prices or products disrupt that marketplace. 
The nature of the AI disruption is thus fundamentally different from 
prominent previous disruptions. Past disruptions have typically involved 
taking market share from previously dominant firms and then leaving a sta-
ble set of players intact who control the once-disruptive technology. With 
AIs, holding a market leadership position would become far less certain on 
an ongoing basis, in part because AI advisers could rapidly redirect large 
portions of the market toward that newly preferable business based on small 
variations in price, product, or other advantages. Currently, small price ad-
vantages might not be sizeable enough to be noticed by most consumers, 
given information asymmetries and decisionmaking limitations.177 Even if 
consumers today noticed, high switching costs may deter them from act-
ing.178 In a hyperswitching market, the leading firms’ market shares could 
become regularly volatile, leaving them in a state of continual vulnerability 
as AIs transform small competitive advantages into major disruptions. 
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2. Faster Disruption 
By speeding up the rate of customer switching, AIs could produce a 
high-speed version of the basic model for perfect competition used by gener-
ations of economists. In that model, when a firm offers a better product, 
consumers flock to the product. Other firms are forced to adapt their prod-
ucts by innovating in some way or dropping their prices. If they cannot, they 
go out of business. 
Large increases in the speed of customer switching are easier to imagine 
if an AI were to capture 60% to 80% of the market share, in accordance with 
market dynamics and the shares of leaders in many digital services.179 But a 
higher customer churn and synced advice are possible even if the AI industry 
were highly fragmented. If a new bank account pays higher rates than all 
others, presumably even ten competent and independent AIs would respond 
by sending their rate-focused consumers to that new bank. The bank offer-
ing the new and better account surely would not want to hide its benefits 
from the AIs. Already, different companies’ price-setting algorithms have 
demonstrated an ability to sync by using the same (or an interconnected) ex-
ternal reference point. In one instance, the price of a book, The Making of a 
Fly by Peter Lawrence, ballooned on Amazon from a few dollars to over 
twenty-three million dollars because each of two sellers of the item had algo-
rithmically set its price in relation to the other.180 
For hyperswitching to accelerate disruption, large numbers of consum-
ers must receive similar advice—if not all of them directed to the same prod-
uct, then at least to different products at a new seller or group of sellers. That 
assumption requires examination given the modern trend toward firms per-
sonalizing products. Would advice given necessarily be the same to millions 
of users? The answer will likely differ by type of product.181 But algorithms 
have for years openly used the purchases of similarly situated consumers to 
make recommendations, with Amazon telling shoppers, “Customers who 
bought this item also bought . . . .”182 On a subtler level, a recent Facebook 
experiment showed how social networks’ algorithmic decisions can influence 
feelings—producing “massive-scale emotional contagion.”183 
If AIs were to give similar shopping assistance to a substantial portion of 
a given market, hyperswitching could cause firms to fail at a faster rate than 
prior industry disruptions. The retail industry transformation as a result of 
e-commerce occurred in a relatively gradual manner for individual compa-
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nies. Borders’s and Blockbuster’s difficulties, for instance, occurred over 
more than a decade. During this time, the companies launched their own 
online services and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (reorganization) before 
resorting to Chapter 7 (liquidation).184 The decline also was incremental in 
the sense that different retailers closed at different times and often began by 
closing some subset of stores each year. The cumulative job losses were sub-
stantial, but the economy absorbed the turmoil of any given retailer failing in 
a more isolated manner.185 Creditors and investors could also adjust and lim-
it their exposure as firms slowly lost customers.186 
In contrast, in the face of hyperswitching, firms might lose large por-
tions of their consumers not over the course of many years but over the 
course of months, weeks, or even days. To be clear, any given market’s tran-
sition to faster switching would happen gradually, as consumers slowly 
adopted AIs.187 But once a critical mass of consumers were following AI ad-
vice in a given industry, without changes to the basic capital structure that 
most firms adopt today, firms could rapidly become unable to pay their bills 
and struggle to stay in business.188 Insolvency will be even more likely if AIs 
succeed in driving prices closer to marginal cost, as would be expected if they 
remove existing sources of overcharge from switching hassles, information 
asymmetries, and behavioral limitations.189 
Some consumer product markets could thereby become more like 
stocks, in the sense of being subject to sudden sizeable market swings.190 Of 
course, unlike with stocks, some firms gaining sales might struggle to ac-
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commodate too large an influx of customers on shorter notice.191 But AIs 
would be expected to accelerate switching, and the possibility cannot be 
ruled out that they will do so to an extreme that causes firms to fail far more 
rapidly than in prior disruptions. 
3. Larger-Scale Disruption 
Precisely which industries will be vulnerable is difficult to know in ad-
vance, but clearly not all markets would be equally subject to hyperswitch-
ing. Several major categories of consumer expenditures are inherently more 
resistant to hyperswitching, regardless of how incumbents respond to the 
competitive threat. For example, the time and energy needed to move 
apartments likely insulates rental expenditures—about $600 billion—from 
drastic increases in switching.192 Similarly, much of the $2.27 trillion in pri-
vate sector healthcare expenditures is less likely to be subject to hyperswitch-
ing anytime soon, due to institutional barriers such as insurer limits on 
which doctors a patient can choose and employer limits on sponsored insur-
ance plans.193 
Broadly speaking, consumers are more likely to delegate spending to AIs 
for more fungible and less branded products. But fungibility is a nuanced 
and dynamic concept.194 Financial services, paper, rice, and internet access 
are each highly fungible in the sense that the basic product is not particularly 
differentiated. If the download speeds for two companies are comparable 
and sufficient to stream movies and conduct video calls, a user is unlikely to 
be able to distinguish between two ISPs other than on price.195 
With respect to brands, AIs are unlikely to sway consumers away from 
emotional attachments. But even within branded industries, some portion of 
the market will likely view the product as somewhat fungible. Some people 
care little about who cuts their hair or which manufacturer makes their jeans 
and socks. Others are greatly attached to a particular stylist or logo. 
Further complicating the matter is that consumers often infer product 
quality from brands, and do so poorly. People pay over 50% more for Ener-
gizer batteries that in laboratory tests last only as long as obscure brands.196 
The typical consumer will spend three times as much for Bayer headache re-
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lief than the chemically identical store brand, even though pharmacists and 
healthcare professionals buy the latter for themselves.197 Electronic com-
merce has already created “markets . . . with less consumer loyalty to a spe-
cific firm, perhaps due to better access to information or the reduction of 
other search costs.”198 AIs should further erode loyalty and profit in many 
categories by more comprehensively identifying which brands actually con-
vey meaningful quality differences. 
The discussion of brands illustrates how AIs’ disruption can reach a 
broader array of firms, not only horizontally across industries but also verti-
cally within a given industry. The consumer goods industry, for instance, can 
be divided vertically into the retailers that sell products and the manufactur-
ers that produce them. The first generation of disruptive e-commerce com-
panies, like Amazon, mostly lured customers away from retailers to purchase 
the same basic products as before.199 AIs could do more of the same, signifi-
cantly lowering online and offline retailers’ profits on a sustained basis by 
making it easier to compare prices within and across stores.200 Where AIs 
differ is in their greater potential to destabilize manufacturers, like Bayer and 
Energizer, by helping consumers to see that a better option is available. 
Reaching manufacturing, rather than just retail, would mean AIs would 
have a much larger impact on the retail-goods economy. Most of the large-
firm profit in the consumer sector is not in the resale of others’ products but 
in manufacturing. Many of the retailers that folded were large and nation-
wide, but in 1990—before email was popular—Blockbuster and Circuit City 
were outside the top 100 most profitable companies in the United States.201 
More numerous in the list of the largest companies by value were manufac-
turers—led by Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Johnson & Johnson.202 
Those companies made the transition to e-commerce, as they now simply 
sell their products through new online channels.203 Additionally, some of 
manufacturers’ profits have gradually shifted to the largest retailers, includ-
ing Amazon and Walmart, which earn a considerable and increasing portion 
of their profits from manufacturing their own products.204 
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In terms of revenues, financial services account for roughly 7% of GDP, 
or $679.7 billion.205 Retail goods, telecommunications, travel, and other po-
tentially switchable services constitute another five trillion dollars.206 It is al-
so possible that trillions of dollars in business expenditures could become 
automated, particularly the portion controlled by small businesses.207 AIs 
could destabilize on a scale unlike anything seen before. 
* * * 
The conclusion that AIs bring about a new kind of disruption does not, 
by itself, mean that AIs pose a problem. For now, the main point is that AIs 
have the potential to create a significantly more enduring, faster, and larger 
scale disruption than anything seen before. These differences make past les-
sons and models less relevant. 
Among the considerations omitted from current analyses of automated 
commerce, the rest of this Part focuses on two main categories: large-scale 
inefficiencies and market volatility. It also explores some of the competitor 
responses, market adjustments, and laws that could limit hyperswitching, 
even in an economy driven by AIs. 
B. Managerial Responses 
Many plausible responses by sellers to AIs would lead to costs over-
looked in current discussions. These theoretical costs would not necessarily 
increase inefficiency. But if they materialize, they would at least mean that 
automated commerce would prove less efficient than expected, even if 
hyperswitching made those markets appear closer to the basic model of per-
fect competition. Several of these costs are briefly examined here. 
1. Capitalization 
Market uncertainty causes real firms to “hoard cash and cut debt to 
hedge against future shocks, further reducing investment and hiring.”208 Rea-
sons for creating these asset buffers include the anticipation of creditors 
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 206. Id. Other services include “Professional and other services” at $193 billion and “Per-
sonal care and clothing services” (such as dry cleaning) at $156 billion, in 2017 expenditures. 
See id. 
 207. Beyond personal consumption expenditures, about $1.9 trillion is spent on equip-
ment and intellectual property products alone. See id. at tbl.5.2.5. 
 208. Ivan Alfaro et al., The Finance-Uncertainty Multiplier 1–2 (Soc’y for Econ. Dynam-
ics, Meeting Paper No. 887, 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed017/887.html 
[https://perma.cc/7X57-W658]; see also Stijn Claessens, Capital and Liquidity Requirements: A 
Review of the Issues and Literature, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 735 (2014). 
854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:815 
freezing them out or of sudden market shifts.209 Increasing cash or other liq-
uid assets would be a potentially effective defense against hyperswitching be-
cause it would enable firms to cover their day-to-day expenses for an 
extended period while revenues declined, thus buying time to develop new 
revenue-generating or cost-cutting strategies. A related alternative would be 
to purchase some kind of financial instrument, such as insurance, that essen-
tially serves the same purpose of providing access to funds in the face of sud-
den customer exodus. 
Since 2000, real economy firms have begun storing funds at unprece-
dented levels, with Google able to buy American Express outright and Gen-
eral Motors holding liquid assets equivalent to half of its overall worth.210 
Many companies surely hold excess liquidity out of a desire to purchase up-
start competitors or make strategic investments. Observers have also posited 
that a substantial portion of this asset accumulation comes out of caution in 
the face of competitive threats.211 In a hyperswitching economy, holding 
greater reserves or having better access to emergency funding might become 
even more of a competitive advantage, since reserves could defend against or 
fund more destructive price wars that drive less well-capitalized competitors 
out of business.212 
Purchasing instability insurance or hoarding liquid assets may be a ra-
tional strategy for the firm and its executives who want to keep their jobs in 
the face of hyperswitching. But hoarding assets can be harmful to the econ-
omy. The more capital a firm is simply saving, the less capital is being put to 
productive use. Depending on the macroeconomic context, a widespread 
hoarding increase by firms in response to hyperswitching could be a mean-
ingful drag on the economy.213 
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2. Conglomeration 
Another possible business response to AI disruption would be for firms 
to diversify their operations. As an example of one company holding a diver-
sified portfolio, General Electric grew beyond its original power generation 
activities into areas such as healthcare, media, and finance.214 The leading 
explanations for why businesses diversify are to gain strategic advantage and 
to manage risk.215 
Diversification could be particularly effective in defending against 
hyperswitching. A firm that sells paper towels would be less likely to fail in 
the face of paper towel hyperswitching if that firm had many different prod-
ucts—such as food and mattresses. For conglomeration to provide insurance 
against AI disruption, competitors’ product improvements must occur at 
different times across the conglomerate’s product portfolio. The more the 
products are different, the more likely any disruptions would occur at differ-
ent times. Conglomeration would provide additional insulation from 
hyperswitching if some of the firm’s products had less susceptibility to AI 
disruption, such as due to brand loyalty.216 
If AIs lead to such conglomeration, it could increase business costs. Ex-
cess corporate diversification is “widely believed to be inefficient,”217 alt-
hough the reasons for that consensus are diverse and the support for it far 
from decisive. Some have found that research and development expenditures 
and overall innovation are lower in conglomerates, but the evidence is more 
suggestive than conclusive.218 
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Perhaps the clearest explanation for why conglomeration would be inef-
ficient is the lack of specialization and increased managerial costs of running 
a sprawling organization whose lines of business have limited synergies. It is 
worth noting that the particular type of conglomeration sought in response 
to AIs may be even more inefficient than other types of conglomeration, in 
that hyperswitching firms would (a) pursue conglomeration for defensive 
rather than revenue-growing reasons and (b) emphasize product differences 
to lessen the chance of multiple products facing similar customer flight. Both 
motives would decrease a company’s specialization more than diversification 
undertaken for growth and synergies in related product categories. 
The strategy of diversification may make economic sense for the firm 
while still imposing significant costs on the economy if many managers cor-
rectly believed diversification was necessary to survive, and if the hypotheses 
about diversification being inefficient are correct. An efficient market in the 
era of AIs may thus involve higher costs from conglomeration alongside 
lower transaction costs due to consumer automation. If so, the standard pol-
icy analysis focused on transaction costs would omit a potentially significant 
variable, since it does not consider conglomeration. 
3. Consolidation and Collusion 
Part II discussed how collusion offers incumbents a way to block AIs 
from taking hold, because if all sellers offer the same price, the AIs become 
less helpful to consumers.219 The incentive to collude persists once AIs dom-
inate a market. Indeed, the incentive to collude would presumably be even 
greater in extreme hyperswitching markets, because price coordination 
would prevent an imminent threat—the potentially devastating sudden mass 
departure of customers—rather than a more speculative rise of AIs. 
The protection that collusion affords from hyperswitching could distort 
markets by giving firms heightened incentives to merge. This added incen-
tive comes from the greater ease of collusion in concentrated industries.220 
As the incentives to collude rise, the incentives to consolidate an industry 
would also rise. 
Moreover, firms might more easily acquire competitors in AI markets: 
once it became clear that a seller was vulnerable to lost revenues from 
hyperswitching, that seller’s market value would drop, making it a cheaper 
target. AIs thus might accelerate industry consolidation, which can under-
mine competition in light of antitrust regulators’ difficulty in identifying 
 
 219. See supra Section II.B.4. 
 220. Albert Hirschman long ago posited that consumers in more competitive industries 
are more likely to exit. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 149, at 55–62. Subsequent empirical re-
search has supported the proposition that in markets with a greater number of competitors 
consumers switch more readily. T. Randolph Beard et al., “Can You Hear Me Now?” Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty Under Increasing Competition, 58 J.L. & ECON. 717, 719 (2015). 
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harmful mergers.221 Any increase in collusion or anticompetitive mergers 
and acquisitions resulting from hyperswitching would need to be added to 
the costs of AIs.222 
C. Market Volatility 
Some types of market volatility can impose costs on the economy, which 
means that incorporating those costs makes economic models of future 
markets more accurate. This Section considers the potential instability im-
plications of automated markets. The inquiry begins with finance because 
much of our regulatory conception of harmful instability comes from finan-
cial crises, which have been a regular and destructive part of the U.S. econo-
my since its inception.223 The insights into systemic risk from finance will 
prove instructive as the discussion turns to AIs in other industries. Indeed, 
as the discussion will show, even if hyperswitching never causes a crisis, it 
could still cause volatility costs worthy of attention. 
To be clear, an AI-driven future financial crisis might appear today to be 
highly unlikely. But the same would have been true for the major crises of 
the last 150 years—the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Flash 
Crash—if their particular triggers were analyzed even a few years in ad-
vance.224 These crises each had new triggers, and as even the CEO of the 
largest U.S. bank recognizes, “The trigger to the next crisis will not be the 
same as the trigger to the last one—but there will be another crisis.”225 The 
discussion in this Section is animated by a recognition that a key task of fi-
nancial regulation is to move “unknown risks” to “known risks,”226 and that 
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observers have in the past often missed the possibility of known market 
changes triggering financial crises. The purpose is thus to broaden the cur-
rently narrow set of theoretical factors weighed in developing regulatory pol-
icy as commercial transactions become more automated—and in many 
regards more like finance. 
1. The Structure of Past Financial Instability 
Financial stability predictions are informed by a risk factor analysis, 
drawing on historical experience.227 Even decades after a crisis, experts often 
disagree about the precise triggers and how much they mattered. But three 
major features of past financial crises have particular relevance to AIs: (1) a 
massive flight from large financial institutions, (2) product innovation, and 
(3) a link between finance and the real economy.228 All these features were 
apparent in the most recent crisis, the Great Recession, and some of them 
contributed to the Great Depression and the “Flash Crash” of 2010. 
(a) The Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1932, the value of stocks 
listed in the New York Stock Exchange dropped by 83%, and the United 
States plunged into a devastating depression that left a quarter of the work-
force unemployed.229 The Great Depression witnessed the “classic example 
of systemic risk,” the bank run.230 Millions of people panicked about the safe-
ty of their money held by banks, which caused them to withdraw deposits.231 
These withdrawals triggered a chain reaction of bank failures.232 A sud-
den, unexpected mass departure of business from a bank is immediately 
problematic because banks normally only have a small amount of liquid re-
serves on hand, historically less than 5% of what they owe to customers.233 
Banks invest the rest to earn revenue, such as by making loans. If too many 
customers seek to withdraw money the bank does not have, the bank may 
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fail.234 Bank runs in the Great Depression illustrate the danger of contagion, 
a consistent theme in major financial crises. Contagion can be defined as “an 
indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can 
render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent.”235 
Another contributor to the Great Depression was money scarcity result-
ing from both bank runs and the stock market crash. People refused to lend, 
invest, or deposit because they trusted neither banks nor businesses in the 
real economy to stay afloat.236 Since so much of the business world depends 
on access to funding, this hesitation deprived society of a vital resource, 
deepening and extending the economic harm.237 
(b) The Great Recession. The financial crisis of the late 2000s, also known 
as the Great Recession, “crushed the real economy and cost countless people 
their jobs, homes, and businesses.”238 Real estate played a similar role in this 
episode to bank runs and stock speculation in the Great Depression.239 Over 
the several years leading up to the crisis, millions of Americans bought hous-
es that they could ultimately only afford as long as real estate prices contin-
ued to rise.240 When real estate prices dropped, homeowners began to default 
in record numbers, and individual banks proceeded to lose tens of billions of 
dollars in mortgage-related financial instruments.241 
By 2008, the typical large bank owed money to many different institu-
tional customers, including other banks and hedge funds.242 As it became 
clear that large investment banks like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
would suffer considerable losses as a result of toxic mortgage securities, 
hedge funds and other large institutions began withdrawing billions of dol-
lars from those banks to avoid the risk of losing their money if the banks 
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failed.243 Investors also became concerned that banks would fail and bring 
down investment funds with them. Investors thus began to pull out their 
money from a diverse set of institutions, leading not only to a stock market 
crash but a freeze in the supply of credit.244 A massive government bailout 
likely prevented a depression, but the collective losses were substantial.245 
Product innovations laid the foundations for the subprime mortgage 
meltdown and its subsequent effect on the financial system. Subprime loans 
often involved payment schemes that started at a reasonable rate and then 
after a few years ballooned to a level that the borrower could not afford.246 
Additionally, financial institutions transformed the mortgages into diverse 
financial products by dividing up their payment streams and repackaging 
them into various new forms of securities. As U.S. Comptroller of the Cur-
rency John Hawke described it in 2004, “Derivatives trading, hedging, secu-
ritization, credit scoring, and structured finance, which are all routine parts 
of banking today, were exotic or nonexistent 30 years ago.”247 These new 
products, which originated in consumer spending, increased systemic risk.248 
(c) Flash Crashes. Technological innovations over the past several dec-
ades have increasingly contributed to stock market crashes.249 Automated 
trading has accelerated in recent years, fueled by algorithms that buy and sell 
stocks or other securities in a billionth of a second, without any human in-
volvement.250 These algorithms, also called robo-investors, can scan news re-
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leases and make trades in a split second, before a human could begin to 
read.251 
The most dramatic technology-driven stock market swing came in May 
2010, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted 1,000 points in a 
few minutes, wiping away almost a trillion dollars in value.252 Perhaps more 
alarming, it was not clear for months that the cause was the interplay of large 
investment funds’ trading algorithms.253 The spark was a single firm that had 
made the highly unusual decision to sell off a large position—$4.1 billion in 
futures contracts—as fast as possible.254 Even a few years earlier, that selloff 
would have taken hours if not days to complete, but in 2010 it was executed 
in minutes.255 As the selloff began and triggered a drop in the price of the fu-
tures contracts, other robo-investors saw opportunity and bought.256 Because 
the selloff was larger than expected, however, the price kept dropping, which 
caused a computerized panic in which the algorithms believed they were tak-
ing on too much risk and sought to sell.257 That massive selloff, through tens 
of thousands of moves within minutes, created a downward spiral of stock 
prices that became known as the Flash Crash.258 
One key feature of the Flash Crash was the increase in systemic risk due 
to the interplay of many different firms’ algorithms, each of which shared 
some basic decisionmaking criteria.259 It was only when an automatic five-
second pause was imposed that the trading began to stabilize.260 Numerous 
other flash crashes, including one that led the Nasdaq to suspend trading for 
three hours, have occurred in recent years, and by some accounts crisis has 
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been averted only through interventions.261 Flash crashes illustrate how the 
convergence of finance, technology, and fragmented actors can increase sys-
temic risk, leaving regulators lost as to how to respond.262 
* * * 
Despite variation in and debates about the causes of financial instability, 
several basic observations can be distilled from these three historical exam-
ples. Financial institutions risk failing if they rely on volatile resources to re-
main solvent. The failure of large financial institutions can cause a domino 
effect that takes down the economy. Furthermore, markets—rather than 
merely institutions—play a key role in systemic risk.263 
More concretely, history shows the dangers of regulators missing how 
microeconomic developments can trigger macroeconomic crises. Financial 
regulators failed to foresee microeconomic consumer behavioral dynamics 
that could cause large shifts in financial markets, such as panicked with-
drawals of funds even from solvent banks and problematic mortgages. Fi-
nancial regulators also failed to monitor nonfinancial changes such as real 
estate prices and algorithms used in trading. 
2. Financial Product Instability 
This account of past financial instability is relevant to AIs because they 
are a microeconomic, consumer-level, technological development originat-
ing outside of finance with the potential to shift a large amount of funds 
within the financial system. AIs promise to expand access to a consumer fi-
nancial innovation—automated advice on everyday transactions—in a man-
ner analogous to how innovative mortgages and their derivatives became far 
more widely available leading up to the Great Recession.264 Before the latest 
wave of digital intermediaries, financial advice was limited to a higher-
income portion of the population that could afford it.265 AIs aim to extend 
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that financial advice to anyone with internet access.266 The innovation of au-
tomated advice is layered onto an array of end product fintech innovations 
for borrowing, holding, and transferring money.267 Moreover, unlike twenty 
years ago, consumers today can widely open, use, and close financial ac-
counts online.268 
Widespread automated advice, along with the new possibility of opening 
and closing accounts online, provide the foundations for AIs to produce 
mass withdrawals of funds from large financial institutions like those seen in 
the Great Depression and Great Recession. The motivation for the with-
drawal of funds would be different—in a hyperswitching context, more in-
formed and rational customers could exit in pursuit of product features, 
such as higher interest rates, rather than the fear that their bank could col-
lapse. But the effect could be similar, since banks today still have only a small 
portion of liquid assets on hand to pay depositor demands. Regulators have 
not needed to worry about such sudden withdrawals because since the Great 
Depression, retail deposits have been marked by an absence of switching, 
thanks in part to the federal government’s guarantee on deposits.269 
The scale of potential bank withdrawals is relevant to systemic risk. 
Consumers and small businesses—the prime customers for AI advisers—
account for 46% of banks’ profits.270 For some of the largest banks, like 
Citigroup, well over 60% of revenues come from consumer banking and 
credit cards—sectors that could be subject to digital switching.271 Thus, a 
large portion of big banks’ profits, not to mention funds that they have lent 
out that may not be immediately available, are at risk of flight. 
The more difficult question is what portion of those deposits AIs might 
drive elsewhere in a short amount of time. Some consumers would presum-
ably not delegate to AIs the ability to change bank accounts. Also, banks are 
attempting to make their services sticky through automated payments and 
reward programs. But unlike many other products and services, money is 
more fungible and thus more difficult for any financial institution to person-
alize. People might have different preferences with respect to whether they 
receive higher interest rates rather than lower monthly fees. But given the 
basic fungibility of credit, a subset of financial institutions—whether fintechs 
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or recent entrants into retail banking such as Goldman Sachs—could attract 
large portions of the market if they have lower cost structures or other com-
petitive advantages, such as innovative apps or higher yields earned by in-
vesting deposits. 
Although such scenarios are unlikely and unpredictable, so are the sce-
narios that financial regulators routinely analyze to prevent crises. The Fed-
eral Reserve regularly conducts stress tests, or modeling exercises of 
doomsday scenarios, as part of systemic risk regulation. These tests provide 
another perspective on the relevance of hyperswitching. A recent test indi-
cated that the largest U.S. banks are sound because during a prolonged reces-
sion they would lose on the order of $526 billion in revenues over several 
years.272 That figure is considerably less than the $4.7 trillion dollars in an-
nual revenues that Goldman Sachs estimated are vulnerable to financial 
technology challengers—known as fintechs—stealing clients by offering 
more innovative products and mobile banking services.273 
Moreover, the Fed stress test typically assumes that large banks essen-
tially retain their basic consumer market shares, meaning that they regain 
prior revenue levels as the economy recovers.274 The tests do not simulate the 
sudden loss of many customers who may never return. If hyperswitching hit 
a single large bank particularly hard, rather than being generally distributed 
across the industry as in the Federal Reserve’s stress tests,275 investors and 
creditors would be expected to withdraw funds and raise the bank’s cost of 
capital.276 Broader liquidity constraints could follow. The loss of direct cus-
tomers and concern by other financial actors could collapse one or more sys-
temically important financial institutions, threatening the financial system 
through a consumer algorithmic contagion not currently factored into stress 
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tests that are intended to model speculative and dangerous future scenari-
os.277 
3. Real Economy Turbulence 
What might be the implications of extreme hyperswitching in the real 
economy? A risk analysis of large firm failures leading to harmful turbulence 
is a familiar part of the financial regulatory framework but absent from mar-
ket regulatory analyses of the real economy.278 As demonstrated by the case 
of retail disruption in the face of e-commerce, the real economy can undergo 
widespread firm failures and upheaval without prompting crises. It is none-
theless worth examining hyperswitching’s volatility implications even in 
markets outside finance, given that AIs are disruptive in new, far-reaching 
ways that intersect with past crises and recent scholarship. 
Although an increase in firm failures can signal robust competition that 
brings social benefits, the turnover can bring social costs. As a concrete ex-
ample, the government spends hundreds of billions of dollars as a result of 
unemployment.279 If hyperswitching causes more rapid business failures, any 
additional equilibrium unemployment costs would add currently overlooked 
inefficiencies.280 
Bailouts are another governmental expenditure that could result from 
real markets in turmoil. Most recently, starting in 2008, Congress extended a 
bailout package of about $80 billion to General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, 
two of the “big three” U.S. automakers.281 Economist Jeffrey Sachs supported 
the automakers’ requests for a bailout in front of Congress by testifying, 
“Lehman Brothers triggered the biggest worldwide crisis in generations. 
Don’t do it again with this industry.”282 Despite failing to prevent reorganiza-
tion bankruptcy, the bailout may have shielded the economy from greater 
volatility. GM and Chrysler successfully emerged from bankruptcy as profit-
able businesses, which some scholars believe prevented greater economic 
harm.283 Regardless of the merits of Sachs’s crisis argument, the fact that a 
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combination of political and intellectual forces can bring about a large tax-
payer bailout for the real economy means that extreme hyperswitching could 
lead to costly bailouts. Again, these theoretical costs—along with any from 
hoarding liquid assets, conglomeration, collusion, and other sources—do not 
necessarily outweigh the theoretical benefits of lowering transaction costs. 
But they are potentially sizeable enough to factor into the cost-benefit analy-
sis of pro-AI policies. 
Might there be legitimate financial stability implications of real economy 
firms failing due to AI-driven demand volatility? Recent research has given 
greater reason to believe that the real economy implicates financial instabil-
ity. Before the Great Recession, local real estate market prices were viewed as 
sufficiently uncorrelated to minimize the risk of a national housing bubble, 
and mortgage markets were not seen as subject to contagion.284 The crisis re-
vealed that various financial innovations linked these markets in destabiliz-
ing ways, prompting scholars to undertake broader studies of the interplay 
between the real economy and economic downturns. For instance, econo-
mists have found that uncertainty in the real economy can drive economic 
downturns.285 Investors and creditors may respond to real economy uncer-
tainty by freezing up the flow of money available to real economy firms out 
of concern that it is too difficult to know which will fail.286 
If hyperswitching created an inability to predict future profit per sale 
and total sales in some markets,287 it could create uncertainty about which 
real firms would fail. Real economy hyperswitching is not tied to financial 
markets in the same way that housing is—through mortgages. But most large 
firms are intricately linked to financial markets through various loans and 
securities. Just as investors were overly optimistic about the houses underly-
ing mortgage-backed securities leading up to the Great Recession, many be-
lieve that excess optimism fuels investors’ high valuations of the stock 
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market today.288 Stocks are securities whose underlying asset is a business, 
analogous to how mortgage-backed securities are based on houses. 
A sudden dissipation of large amounts of firms’ revenues due to 
hyperswitching could prompt a loss of investor confidence. If that loss of 
confidence spread widely enough across capital markets, it would lead to a 
credit freeze, or reluctance to lend money, which has had destructive effects 
on the economy and exacerbated past economic downturns.289 As a theoreti-
cal matter, a hyperswitching economy could cause instability and a drop in 
the value of firms in ways analogous to how the fall of housing prices and 
surprising unpredictability of payments on mortgages destabilized financial 
markets in the Great Recession. 
Hyperswitching in the real economy has other similarities to past finan-
cial crisis triggers. The acceleration of purchase decisions is one. By way of 
illustration, between 2000 and the Flash Crash of 2010, the average length of 
time that stocks were held fell from eight months to under a minute.290 Un-
like stocks, most goods and services in the real economy cannot practically 
shift in microseconds. But large companies with a steady stream of purchases 
nationwide could within seconds see their sales fall drastically. More to the 
point, once markets learned of a pending hyperswitch going against a given 
company, that company’s valuation could instantly plummet. By speeding 
up the pace of commerce, AIs may directionally transform the real economy 
in ways similar to how algorithmic trading has already altered stock markets: 
by injecting extra volatility and decreasing the amount of time that regula-
tors have to respond. 
AIs also make real product markets more like financial markets by in-
creasing the chances of “herd behavior.”291 Bank runs and stock market pan-
ics have exhibited asset withdrawal contagion, in which the acts of some 
subset of the population heavily influence those of many others.292 AIs can 
more closely link consumer choices by, for instance, passing a deal discov-
ered by one consumer on to millions of others.293 
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A key consideration in gauging the instability risks of real economy 
hyperswitching is the potential scale. The larger the pool of volatile assets in 
the economy, the greater the potential risks of a crisis.294 As noted above, tril-
lions of dollars annually are potentially vulnerable to some level of 
hyperswitching—amounts that exceed annual real estate expenditures.295 
Which of these markets will reach a level of problematic volatility, rather 
than beneficial turbulence, is unknowable at this point. Given the many ways 
that markets will respond, and the heterogeneity of markets, the chances of 
some kind of a real economy-wide AI contagion sparking a crisis should be 
assumed to be extremely low—as should be assumed for an AI-driven bank 
run. 
But highly unlikely risks animate economic stability regulation. Accord-
ingly, scholars have produced a chorus of generalized warnings since 2008 
that the financial system has become far more dangerous, akin to a tinderbox 
in danger of being lit.296 They point to the increased risk from faster financial 
transactions, steady financial complexification from innovation, growing po-
tential for financial contagion, and greater interconnectedness among finan-
cial institutions.297 Those discussions seldom mention specific triggers, and 
when they do they hem more closely to recent crises by, for instance, focus-
ing on the expansion of automated financial trading or new types of mort-
gage securitization. As a result, the literature rarely challenges deeply 
embedded assumptions on market activities thought to be safe, such as bank 
accounts or everyday consumer spending. That literature nonetheless pro-
vides the foundations for understanding why hyperswitching, if it were to 
materialize, could provide a spark to a precariously interconnected financial 
system that has left regulators behind. 
Unlike more micro-oriented consumer protection and antitrust regula-
tion, financial stability regulation cannot wait for a clear problem before be-
ginning preparation. Most specific forecasts will be wrong, and the correct 
ones will almost always appear wrong in advance. Nearly all experts, if asked 
in 1920 about the likelihood of widespread bank runs, or in 2005 about the 
likelihood of a mortgage crisis, would have dismissed any such concerns as 
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speculative—and indeed, some did.298 Despite great uncertainty about how it 
will unfold, the concept of hyperswitching merits attention in instability 
conversations because it sits at the intersection of real-world market devel-
opments, broad scholarly warnings, and historical crisis lessons. 
D. Limits to Hyperswitching 
Interspersed throughout this Part and Part II have been a number of ob-
stacles that might prevent hyperswitching from ever occurring. Sellers have 
many tools to prevent hyperswitching or mitigate its effects. Some of these 
tools are potentially procompetitive, such as product customization, which 
could bring consumers better products but makes it less likely that a large 
portion of the market will receive the same advice at the same time to leave a 
given seller. Other tools are more clearly anticompetitive, such as all sellers 
colluding to set a common price above marginal cost or blocking data access 
through misguided laws. Many responses would simply add to the overall 
cost of doing business, such as forming conglomerates or purchasing disrup-
tion insurance. 
Additionally, markets have inherent limits on the magnitude of 
hyperswitching. Any one company favored by the AI might, for instance, 
have a difficult time accommodating a sudden large increase in customers. 
An inability to ramp up manufacturing fast enough could mean turning 
away many potential customers, who might then stay with incumbents. 
Some service industries would also be particularly difficult to ramp up, since 
airlines would be slow to acquire new airport gate access and restaurants can 
only seat so many people during the dinner rush. Sellers might respond to 
that scarcity by increasing short-term prices, which could lower demand. 
Just as these obstacles to hyperswitching are numerous, so are the many 
ways that AIs and markets might respond to them. Even in an industry with 
highly customized products, a single, large company could offer the full ar-
ray of customized choices and thus rapidly capture the market due to a lower 
cost structure or better customer service as determined by the AI.299 Moreo-
ver, consumers may rely more on AIs as deciding among a larger number of 
customized products becomes increasingly difficult and time intensive. 
Thus, sellers may be limited in their ability to hold on to customers through 
customization—and may accelerate the influence of AIs by doing so. 
As for sellers’ ability to accommodate sudden influxes of customers, 
challengers will seek new ways to increase their capacities quickly. Most in-
dustries are shifting to a rapid order fulfillment model.300 The rise of auto-
mation and part-time, on-demand workers is making it more feasible for a 
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company to fulfill large increases in demand, since the company can obtain 
the modular labor that competitors no longer need.301 Incumbents could re-
verse that labor trend by, for example, locking suppliers or workers into 
longer term contracts to limit challengers’ ability to ramp up capacity. But 
those moves risk increasing costs overall and could accelerate the incum-
bent’s collapse by making it more difficult to match AI-driven drops in cus-
tomers with decreases in costs. 
Additionally, the seller might digitally provide the AI with the number 
of new customers that can be accommodated over a specific period of time, 
such as 10 million new customers every quarter, as capacity is ramped up. At 
that point, hyperswitching would become a race between the challenger’s 
speed at growing capacity and the incumbent’s speed at convincing the AI to 
change its advice. In the meantime, however, capital markets will be as-
sessing the likely winners of that race, and investors’ judgement could be 
swift and devastating for the loser. 
E. Summary 
Space constraints do not allow for a full treatment of these and the many 
other market dynamics that will influence the development of hyperswitch-
ing and result in changes to demand curves and capital markets. But the dis-
cussion above began to sketch a set of relevant factors. These include the 
level of concentration among AIs, consumers’ reliance on AIs for making 
decisions, the AIs’ ability to execute the switch from one seller to another, 
the fungibility of sellers’ products, the variation in cost structure among 
businesses, and the feasibility of quickly ramping up manufacturing or ser-
vices. As more of these are present in a given product market, AIs’ will have 
greater power to direct a large number of consumers toward new businesses. 
If extreme hyperswitching occurs, a separate set of factors will determine 
the extent of its downsides. The threat of hyperswitching could impose non-
salient costs on the economy if businesses respond by holding more liquid 
assets, forming inefficient conglomerates, pursuing excess mergers, collud-
ing, or closing often enough to increase unemployment expenditures. The 
chances of hyperswitching encouraging a crisis or recession would be influ-
enced by the size of the revenue stream that companies might lose, the speed 
of that loss, the links with the financial system, and the level of investor and 
creditor panic. 
To reiterate, hyperswitching is not inherently problematic. The benefits 
are more concrete than the downsides. And even if major downsides materi-
alize, the economic magnitude of the benefits may still outweigh them. But 
analysis of AIs is not a simple binary question of good or bad. From a policy 
perspective, the best path forward may be to embrace hyperswitching, but 
with an eye toward monitoring risks and minimizing costs. For that to hap-
pen, it is not enough to simply assume that markets will take care of the 
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problem—the responses will be too dynamic on both sides to rest assured of 
any particular outcome. As a result, analytic models and the regulatory ar-
chitecture should be updated to minimize automated commerce blind 
spots—tasks taken up in the next Part. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The great uncertainty surrounding AIs’ future means that little can be 
said with great confidence about the need for any particular intervention to-
day. It is nonetheless clear that the law and economics paradigm requires ex-
pansion to include the full set of factors relevant to developing policy. Even 
with a more comprehensive view of the downsides, policies strengthening AI 
informers, such as legislation granting data access and preserving exit, ap-
pear promising. It is also clear that the regulatory architecture is in need of 
adjustments, as the current disconnect between macro- and micro-focused 
authority will weaken oversight of automated markets. 
A. Shifting the Paradigm for Consumer Switching 
To prescribe market interventions correctly, it is necessary to recognize 
the full benefits and costs of adopting any particular policy. The current par-
adigm makes it harder to identify interventions that may increase the bene-
fits and decrease the costs of automated markets. 
1. Recognizing the Upsides of Automated Switching 
We should expect powerful consumer-enhancing AIs to exist. The tech-
nological capabilities are arriving for AIs to guide us through shopping like 
they already do for driving and to execute the transaction should we wish. 
There is also widespread embrace of the idea that the law should reduce 
transaction costs, and law and economics scholars have sometimes referred 
in passing to the possibility that the previous generation of digital intermedi-
aries can help.302 The intellectual and real-world foundations are thus in 
place for a shift toward embracing a pro-AI paradigm. 
Despite these foundations, strong intellectual currents run counter to 
AIs. Besides general concerns about the influence of big technology firms, 
decades of influential scholars—including Coase, Danny Kahneman, and 
Amos Tversky—exposed the law and economics paradigm as greatly under-
estimating various transaction costs in the real world. More recently, legal 
scholars have persuasively demonstrated the persistent failures of mandated 
disclosures and other behavioral law and economics interventions.303 Against 
the backdrop of these important intellectual contributions, the idea of elimi-
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nating significant categories of transaction costs is arguably now a fanciful 
and outdated concept—akin to discredited paradigms such as the Ptolemaic 
placement of the Earth as the center of the universe.304 
As paradigm shifts often do, the recognition of transaction costs as a 
core aspect of markets may have gone too far. Ironically, as scholars have 
over decades gradually adopted the more realistic high-transaction cost as-
sumption, technological developments have made it more relevant to study 
the absence of some categories of transaction costs. What may be needed to 
understand the potential impact of broad pro-AI policies is a model close to 
those used before Coase—albeit updated for the many economic insights 
since then. 
These refinements would need to be incorporated into formal, product-
specific, and in-depth modeling of hypothetical market interventions. Part II 
indicated several categories of promising laws. The most immediately ap-
pealing of these to explore are laws that ensure AIs can access the general 
product- and customer-specific data they need to help consumers. Sellers’ 
current use of the law to freeze the flow of readily available data runs counter 
to the longstanding consensus in law and economics that good legal inter-
ventions should generally remove market information asymmetries, not cre-
ate them.305 Sellers have managed to keep transaction costs high in part by 
blocking intermediaries’ access to such information. A straightforward first 
step would be for judges to end the current practice of allowing sellers—such 
as large banks, rental car companies, and Amazon—to misappropriate laws, 
such as the CFAA to block digital intermediaries from accessing data freely 
available online.306 
Laws mandating that sellers release product data, such as machine-
readable pricing, also appear to offer benefits. Such laws are unnecessary for 
many online sellers that already post such information online. But it is cost-
prohibitive for digital intermediaries to collect price and product infor-
mation from brick-and-mortar sellers. 
There is some empirical evidence that law and economics theory applied 
to digital intermediaries can produce meaningful real-world results. Several 
years ago, I drew on basic concepts of market imperfections to make the case 
for regulation requiring large retailers to make information available in dig-
ital form.307 Although the argument was at the time theoretical and lacked 
real-world evidence, Israel passed such a law requiring grocery stores to 
make price data digitally available. A recent study found that prices dropped 
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as more consumers used comparison websites powered by that data, with the 
law ultimately saving shoppers 4% to 5% on average.308 Given those findings, 
and the theoretical foundations, it is worth at least experimenting with in-
formation access laws in the United States. 
The final category of data access laws needed for AIs relate to personal 
account data. Europe passed such laws on the basis of a consumer right to 
that access.309 But scholars have proposed similar laws based on law and eco-
nomics analyses.310 Assuming these laws would not discourage otherwise 
valuable information collection, U.S. lawmakers and regulators should con-
sider taking similar action. Some consumer protection agencies, such as the 
CFPB, have the ability to pass relevant rules in their regulated industries but 
have yet to act.311 Despite embracing the role of digital intermediaries, regu-
lators have remained more focused on regulating consumer businesses than 
supporting consumer intermediaries. 
Another set of high-stakes laws involves customer exit. Economic theory 
provides support for preserving AIs’ ability to cancel accounts if a consumer 
has delegated such authority. This inference flows from the importance of 
exit in markets.312 Nationwide legislation like that in California, requiring an 
online cancellation for services allowing online subscription, also seems sen-
sible.313 
More important than any particular proposal is updating the intellectual 
framework so that observers are more likely to identify market problems that 
AIs could solve. If the default assumption is that high switching costs are in-
evitable even after “significant” reductions, then evidence of current high 
transaction costs is nothing surprising—and nothing that should prompt re-
form: it would be expected that consumers remain tied to Amazon for order-
ing products online and rarely switch bank accounts. 
On the other hand, if the default assumption is instead, as it should be, 
that virtual assistants could considerably lower switching costs, regulators 
would view minimal switching from Amazon or Citibank as worthy of atten-
tion. That reaction would prompt them to analyze more closely the dynam-
ics that inhibit switching. While the lack of switching could be due to benign 
factors such as affection for the brand, the analysis could identify the set of 
court challenges, anticompetitive practices, and technological barriers that 
firms deploy to thwart or capture digital intermediaries. 
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Ultimately, policymakers that take AIs seriously would be animated by a 
set of top-level inquiries: Why is there no service that allows people to com-
pare prices across online and brick-and-mortar retailers—a kind of Google 
Maps for shopping that would tell us how we can save the most money and 
spend the least amount of time? Why are digital intermediaries unable to 
close accounts on our behalf if we so choose? More importantly, what poli-
cies will move us toward such services? 
Pro-AI policies would be difficult and complex, requiring a host of other 
laws overseeing AIs—including antitrust and consumer protection. But the 
current default assumptions about markets obscure awareness of overlooked 
anticompetitive dynamics that merit analysis and intervention. 
2. Recognizing the Full Downsides of Automated Commerce 
The previous Section’s emphasis on the full upsides of AIs is relevant to 
reforms that would bring more immediate societal benefits. This Section’s 
discussion is more relevant to future stages of automated markets, the seeds 
of which are being planted today. The animating concern here is that dis-
persed legal actors might promote pro-AI policies to an extreme or that 
powerful firms such as Amazon might technologically build automated mar-
kets that suit their interests, without policymakers understanding the full 
costs and risks. Algorithms’ ability to speed up consumer decisionmaking is, 
for instance, correctly viewed as their “most basic advantage.”314 But it is also 
important to recognize the potential for that speed to create risks of market 
volatility and to prompt inefficient managerial responses. Even if pro-AI pol-
icies are still warranted, the failure to factor the downsides into any policy 
analyses makes it less likely reforms will include safeguards such as mecha-
nisms for monitoring market volatility. 
How necessary is it to consider the downsides given the unpredictability 
of how automated commerce will develop and the many ways that markets 
might mitigate hyperswitching? Oddly, this is one area where policy incom-
petence could bring unintended benefits. There are many reasons why the 
law may inadvertently prevent extremes of automated commerce. Lobbying 
efforts by sellers or gridlock in Congress could help prevent pro-AI policies, 
or at least policies that would help AIs to act in consumers’ best interests. 
Although such a policy “failure” (from the typical transaction cost perspec-
tive) may reduce consumer welfare in the short term, it would have an unin-
tended upside of lessening the risks associated with hyperswitching. AIs 
coopted by the leading sellers would, after all, be less likely to shake up the 
industry by recommending that consumers move to an innovating start-up 
seller. 
A problem with this unintentional insurance is that it is unreliable. The 
stability of the financial system should not rest on the expectation that poli-
 
 314. See Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 318 (“The most basic advantage of algo-
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cymakers will be too ineffective to take action in accordance with the exist-
ing paradigm emphasizing competition. Google, Apple, and other informer 
AIs may win over politicians and consumers. 
Thus, AIs will arrive, in one form or another, even without deliberate 
government policies. It is preferable to inform those developments with an 
expanded law and economics framework for perfect competition. The hypo-
thetical gains from extreme consumer sovereignty must be weighed against 
the broader costs of the seller behavior that will seek to undermine it.315 The 
concept of hyperswitching should be added to models as a theoretical out-
come of a policy trajectory toward perfect competition in the automated era. 
B. Redesigning the Regulatory Structure 
Regulators have an important role to play in managing the benefits and 
costs related to digital market acceleration. Across the Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush presidencies, it was widely assumed that banks would man-
age their excess risks because they would be the ones to suffer from any col-
lapse.316 After the financial crisis of 2008, however, that reasoning was widely 
recognized as flawed. Former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, previ-
ously viewed as “Superman” and god-like for his market intervention abili-
ties,317 admitted in 2008, “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of 
lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in 
a state of shocked disbelief.”318 
The regulatory framework currently depends greatly on AIs’ self-interest 
to determine the trajectory they will follow. Governance of AIs mostly rests 
with the FTC and (in consumer finance) with the CFPB.319 Those agencies 
have a more micro-level focus on markets and individual transactions, but 
no stability mission.320 Banking regulators do not have jurisdiction over AIs, 
but they do have jurisdiction over relevant issues such as the capital struc-
ture of firms and macroeconomic conditions.321 As a result, no regulator is 
well situated to either understand or manage AIs’ broader implications. Ad-
justments to both trade and bank regulators are needed as AIs blur micro 
and macro boundaries. 
 
 315. See supra Part III (outlining the inefficiency and instability costs of automated mar-
kets). 
 316. Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel, 
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122476545437862295 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 317. See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 777, 865 (2000). 
 318. Scannell & Reddy, supra note 316. Bank executives’ assumptions that there would be 
a bailout may have increased some of the risky behavior. 
 319. Supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 320. Supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 321. Supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
876 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:815 
1. Adding More Micro to Financial Regulation 
Bank regulators and scholars have begun to intensely study and warn of 
the systemic risks posed by technologies.322 Regulators are also aware of his-
tory’s painful lessons that “extraordinary fluctuations have to be expected 
and guarded against.”323 However, they have paid little attention to the sys-
temic risks of AIs outside of automated trading and robo-investment advis-
ers. Since this inattention partially reflects an outdated regulatory structure, 
understanding the causes of the inattention helps indicate ways to address it. 
Explanations for the lack of awareness. Financial regulators’ inattention 
to AIs is a problem, and one reminiscent of past inability to identify crisis 
triggers. Prudential regulators such as the FDIC and Federal Reserve are 
charged with duties aimed at preventing a financial crisis, such as keeping 
large banks from failing, but they are not expected to predict the precise na-
ture and timing of a crisis.324 They have an impossible task of preparing for 
the unknowable. But prudential regulators have some tools to mitigate the 
impact of digital switching—tools that function most effectively when risks 
are identified in advance. For instance, prudential regulators can require 
banks to increase their capital on hand.325 To best deploy those preventive 
measures or develop new tools, regulators must spot the risk beforehand, 
even if that simply means lightly monitoring its development. 
There are three main explanations for the lack of prudential regulatory 
attention to AIs. One is that prudential regulators operate in the Coasian 
paradigm of assuming high transaction costs. Retail businesses—such as 
consumer banking accounts and credit cards—are typically among banks’ 
most steadily profitable, “safe and boring” businesses that help balance out 
riskier commercial activities.326 The federal government’s promise to reim-
burse depositors up to $250,000 in the case of bank failure, through FDIC 
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insurance, makes panicky bank runs of the traditional sense unimaginable.327 
Thus, banking regulators have had little direct reason to become concerned 
about the speed of customer switching in consumer finance. 
Unlike prudential regulators, the SEC pays attention to the speed of re-
tail-level transactions. The SEC governs stock market trading, which is not 
officially consumer finance.328 The SEC initially lauded the advent of auto-
mated trading, until a series of flash crashes raised alarms.329 The agency has 
since adjusted, and the New York Stock Exchange has paused trading to give 
authorities and private parties the time to course correct.330 Unlike the SEC, 
the banking regulators have not had the same recent experiences in credit 
card and bank account markets. An inference can thus be made that finan-
cial regulators—banking and otherwise—have generally embraced techno-
logical advances that speed up transactions and reduce transaction costs, 
until a crisis demonstrated otherwise.331 
A second explanation for prudential regulators’ omission of digital 
switching lies in the disconnect between financial and nonfinancial markets. 
As mentioned above, the interplay between nonfinancial markets, such as 
real estate, and financial institutions has contributed to past crises.332 Schol-
ars have observed that post-crisis regulations have not gone far enough in 
recognizing the connection between mortgages and real estate.333 If even that 
direct reflection of an immediately preceding crisis failed to sufficiently 
broaden regulators’ nonfinancial lens, other areas outside finance like AIs 
would presumably face an even higher likelihood of inattention. 
Third, prudential regulators pay insufficient attention to consumer 
transactions. This has long been the case and is a major reason why the 
CFPB exists. Before the financial crisis of 2008, prudential regulators also led 
analysis of consumer protection. But they were seen as having failed in that 
mission, focusing too much on preventing bank failures and not enough on 
consumer issues such as subprime loans.334 The creation of the CFPB ad-
dressed the inattention to consumer protection but also institutionally sepa-
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rated the regulatory state’s consumer-level expertise from bank-stability ex-
pertise.335 
Finally, bank regulators lack the ability to collect information from AIs. 
The CFPB’s authorizing statute sets it up to potentially collect nonpublic in-
formation from AIs giving consumer financial advice, but the CFPB does not 
have a larger systemic risk mission.336 Consequently, regulators charged with 
stability are currently mostly limited to publicly available information to un-
derstand AIs’ stability implications. This runs counter to financial regula-
tion’s foundational principle of obtaining information that the public does 
not have in order to guard against risks that private actors cannot sufficiently 
police.337 
Institutional reforms to gain better understanding. The most straightfor-
ward organizational vehicle for rectifying the conceptual and jurisdictional 
gaps would be the Federal Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which Con-
gress created at the same time as the CFPB.338 FSOC has broad monitoring 
capabilities and is charged with identifying “potential emerging threats to the 
financial stability of the United States.”339 FSOC could use its authority to 
study the development of AIs. 
One advantage to FSOC monitoring of AIs is that it operates through 
existing financial regulators, the heads of which are voting members of 
FSOC.340 Those members include the CFPB and bank regulators, which ana-
lyze financial institutions’ capital structure and the implications of macroe-
conomic downturns. The collective expertise of the council thus bridges 
some of the problematic expertise silos that may impede broad understand-
ing of AIs.341 
FSOC monitoring of AIs has limits, however. Since the CFPB only has 
the ability to collect information related to financial advice, any AI that does 
not provide such advice would be off limits. Additionally, the CFPB could 
only access financially related information, and in theory only information 
related to consumer protection. Thus, as long as the AI were helping its cus-
tomers with its advice, the agency would have limited ability to obtain data 
relevant to broader stability concerns. Nor could the CFPB collect infor-
mation from an AI that did not provide financial advice, or from the part of 
the AI’s business that dealt with nonfinancial considerations. 
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To address those regulatory information limits, it may at some point 
make sense for some regulator with a broader stability mandate to have the 
authority to collect relevant information even from nonfinancial AIs. Such 
authority would ensure the financial regulatory structure did not have a 
blind spot regarding AIs. The case for such a reform is less compelling until 
AIs begin to take hold of more consumer spending. The risk with waiting to 
pursue such authority, however, is that reforms may take too long at that 
point. 
The stress test provides another tool for bringing AI awareness into the 
existing financial regulatory structure. Prudential regulators routinely con-
duct such tests, but at the time of this Article’s writing had yet to model AI-
driven disruptions.342 Financial regulators could immediately fill that gap by 
making the internal policy decision to begin occasionally estimating the ef-
fect of hyperswitching when modeling doomsday scenarios. 
Institutional reforms for taking action. Even with perfect regulatory in-
formation, the harder question is what should be done with any regulatory 
knowledge indicating that AIs pose risks. FSOC does not itself enforce or 
write laws but instead relies on its members to act. None of the members of 
the council have clear rulemaking or enforcement powers over AIs outside 
finance.343 
Nor is the path to taking action clear within consumer finance. The reg-
ulators with a stability mandate lack jurisdiction over virtual financial assis-
tants that might redirect consumers. The CFPB has some rulemaking and 
enforcement authority over AIs giving consumer financial advice, but only 
for consumer protection goals—not to lessen stability risks. Thus, regulators 
are largely limited to exercising their authority to require large financial in-
stitutions to increase liquid reserves. 
Depending on how AIs evolve, regulators may need more than this. One 
example would be to give regulators a slow-down mechanism, or pause but-
ton, if advice given to tens of millions of consumers were to begin to destabi-
lize the economy—something like the SEC’s ability to halt trading on stock 
exchanges.344 Or AIs might be required to build a slowdown mechanism into 
their recommendations under certain conditions. Even if these particular 
devices are not the answer, they demonstrate the kind of stopgap measures 
that could be adapted to AI oversight. It would be necessary, of course, to 
constrain the use of such tools to extreme circumstances. The NYSE’s pause 
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feature has been used rarely, giving some comfort that such awesome power 
in the hands of regulators can be used judiciously.345 
2. Adding More Macro to Trade Regulation 
Although the main trade regulator, the FTC, would have reason to adopt 
more accurate economic models for automated markets, structural changes 
to the agency are not justified solely on what is known about automated 
markets. Unlike financial regulators, trade regulators are not tasked with 
identifying and managing improbable future risks to the economy. Nor are 
they necessarily expected to protect AIs, outside of antitrust concerns, alt-
hough an argument could be made that they should do so.346 This Section 
nonetheless considers what eventual trade regulatory architecture might be 
needed in an era of automated markets. 
One way to conceptualize the impact of automated markets is that they 
may eventually make some real economy markets more like financial mar-
kets, in the sense of moving massive revenues around suddenly. Real firms 
may also become more like financial firms in their behavior and risk profile. 
One clear example of this financialization is firms’ holding of large cash re-
serves, or other liquid assets, to guard against risk.347 Federal regulation has 
for over a century required banks to have such liquid resources on hand to 
weather depositor defaults or recessions. Another example of potential con-
vergence would be trade firms’ diversification of product lines to prevent 
failure. Although trade firms may utilize diversification in other ways, the 
more they seek to diversify their core products sold due to trade volatility, 
the more their business model begins to approach that of financial firms, 
such as fund managers’ diversification of portfolios to manage risk.348 
The legal institutions for the real economy, such as bankruptcy law, are 
not set up for the type of challenges faced in finance.349 The FTC has mostly 
consumer protection and antitrust authority.350 Unlike bank regulators, the 
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FTC does not (1) seek to ensure economic stability; (2) regularly collect 
nonpublic information about regulated firms’ internally risky behavior;351 or 
(3) consider whether the firms it regulates have adequate capital reserves to 
withstand market turmoil, or related devices such as “living wills” to unwind 
smoothly in the case of failure so as to minimize the chance of requiring a 
taxpayer bailout.352 
If real firms become more like financial institutions in terms of their 
economic-stability implications, financial regulation may offer a blueprint 
for reform. The FTC could adopt some version of these various tools—stress 
tests, monitoring, capital requirements, and so on—albeit scaled down due 
to the lesser risks posed by real economy firms. For instance, if mandatory 
capital requirements were seen as necessary for real firms to guard against 
stability, regulators could conduct some kind of stress test analysis for crucial 
sectors of the real economy, akin to those conducted for big banks. The actu-
al levels of capital required would presumably be significantly lower for real 
firms, and most would presumably not require any as long as their failure 
would have limited repercussions. 
Since each of these oversight mechanisms is a routine part of the finan-
cial regulatory framework but foreign to the trade regulatory framework, an 
alternative to expanding the FTC’s tools would be to expand the jurisdiction 
of financial regulators to cover nonfinancial firms. Greater coordination 
across trade and financial regulators is needed, in any case, because the real 
economy and financial economy are increasingly intertwined in influencing 
stability.353 Expanding prudential regulators’ authority to cover AIs for sta-
bility purposes and macroeconomic efficiency analyses may provide a supe-
rior regulatory option in the face of extreme hyperswitching. 
The choice between financial and trade regulators should consider 
whether AIs ultimately advise on both financial and nonfinancial matters, as 
would be more likely, or are compartmentalized. Assuming companies’ AIs, 
such as Siri and Alexa, did become trusted advisers for all consumer transac-
tions, it may make sense for financial regulators to lead any stability-related 
oversight of such companies. After all, the lead regulator would need to un-
derstand the implications of financial recommendations for large banks. 
Once financial regulators were conducting some kind of AI monitoring for 
stability, known as an “examination” in banking, it would be ideal not to 
have multiple regulators duplicating the difficult task of understanding 
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complex algorithms and multiplying the burden to businesses of explaining 
those algorithms and handing over information. 
Another consideration would be how to coordinate diverse regulators’ 
activities related to AIs. Again, the most plausible existing body is FSOC. 
FSOC’s composition could be expanded to provide more of a link between 
financial stability and the real economy. Currently, FSOC’s nine regulatory 
members consist only of financial regulators.354 A trade regulator, most sen-
sibly the FTC, could be added. 
FSOC is ultimately an unsatisfying coordinator for AI oversight, howev-
er, since it is so focused on stability and finance. Ideally, a single entity would 
both promote pro-AI policies and manage AI risks. I have previously pro-
posed a technology meta-regulator for reasons outside of automated com-
merce, including consumer protection and antitrust governance, but a 
technology meta-agency could perform a broader risk-regulation mission—
in addition to governing the host of privacy, information access, and other 
threats that scholars have identified.355 Even before any inflection point ar-
rives justifying regulatory restructuring, regulators would ideally leverage 
existing authority, and an expanded analytic framework, to begin studying 
the issue so as to lay the knowledge foundations for high-stakes decisions to 
come. 
CONCLUSION 
Expanding the intellectual paradigm to consider the possibility of 
hyperswitching would continue an ongoing law and economics project. The 
Coase theorem, information economics, and behavioral economics helped 
develop more accurate models for designing the legal system in light of how 
markets actually work.356 In at least one regard, however, automated com-
merce reverses the narrative. Embedded in these past paradigmatic refine-
ments was a (correct) criticism that models had unrealistically assumed 
some feature of perfect competition.357 
This Article has shown that the opposite assumption may make more 
sense in some contexts. Markets will remain imperfect in some ways, such as 
the number of competitors, but it is becoming more realistic to assume mar-
kets can move closer to the perfect-competition economic model through 
minimal switching costs. Once that possibility is recognized, it becomes in-
structive to understand why high transaction costs nonetheless persist and to 
 
 354. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (2012). 
 355. Various scholars have proposed a new technology-focused regulator. See Van Loo, 
Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 5 (proposing a technology meta-regulator and men-
tioning others who have made related proposals for robotics and search commissions). 
 356. Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
72, 73 (1998) (“Mainstream economics . . . is in fact little concerned with what happens in the 
real world.”). 
 357. See supra Section II.A. 
March 2019] Digital Market Perfection 883 
recognize the full societal gains and losses that would result from laws that 
help automate consumer transactions. 
A decision on whether the law should influence AIs’ trajectory has al-
ready been made. Some laws have unintentionally held AIs back, thereby 
preventing both theoretical market volatility and more tangible large-scale 
social welfare gains. More recent laws aimed at helping consumers, such as 
those mandating online cancellation options, may unintentionally benefit 
AIs. 
The important question moving forward is whether the law of automat-
ed switching will continue to develop in a piecemeal manner. A long-term 
regulatory vision should begin with deliberately pro-AI legal reforms, such 
as mandating data access and preserving automated contractual exit. If 
commercial markets become more like stock markets, it will be important to 
monitor a broader set of costs and risks. Regulatory tools may also converge, 
with hyperswitching possibly making an SEC-style stock market pause func-
tion and the Federal Reserve’s bank stress tests relevant outside of finance. 
Regardless, bridging the current intellectual silos separating micro from 
macro concerns, and the financial from the real economy, will better situate 
the regulatory framework to design a comprehensive law of automated mar-
kets. 
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